Rationalization
- Concept · Psychoanalysis, social and cognitive psychology
- Mixed or contested
- Published October 19, 2026
- 14 sources
- 4 min read
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Key facts
- Field
- Psychoanalysis, social and cognitive psychology
- Originators
- Discussed in early psychoanalytic writing, including Ernest Jones (1908); studied in social psychology as self-justification and motivated reasoning
- Also known as
- Rationalization (psychology); Rationalisation; Rationalization (defense mechanism)
- Topics
- Psychoanalysis
State of the evidence
Mixed or contestedResearch outside psychoanalysis shows that people can give reasons for their behavior that do not reflect its actual causes[1][2], and that they adjust beliefs and preferences toward conclusions they want or outcomes they expect, within the limits of what they can plausibly justify[3][4]. Whether this serves a defensive function is contested: dissonance theory treats self-justifying attitude change as relieving psychological discomfort[5][6], but a multi-laboratory replication of a central dissonance paradigm failed[7], and one recent theory treats rationalization as a way of extracting useful information rather than as a defense[8].
Evidence labels summarise the research literature; they are not recommendations. How labels are assigned
Rationalization is a defense mechanism in which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by devising reassuring or self-serving but incorrect explanations for his or her own or others’ behavior[9]. A plausible reason is substituted for a motive that is more self-serving, or otherwise harder to acknowledge, and that is evident to an outsider[9]. The psychoanalyst Ernest Jones wrote on rationalization in everyday life as early as 1908[10]. It was not among the seven Freudian defenses reviewed by social psychologists in 1998[11], but closely related processes have been studied at length under other names. The general theory of defense is described under defense mechanisms.
Rationalization is distinguished from lying by awareness. In the psychoanalytic account the person is usually thought to be unaware, or only minimally aware, of the real motive and sees only the substituted, more socially acceptable reason[9]. It is distinguished from cognitive dissonance by level of description: dissonance theory describes a state and the ways people reduce it, one of which is to give more weight to cognitions that fit an action, such as the reasons for it[12], whereas rationalization names a pattern of explanation without committing to that mechanism.
Rationalization in psychoanalytic classifications
The Defense Mechanism Rating Scales (DMRS) place rationalization at the disavowal level, alongside denial, projection and autistic fantasy[9]. Disavowal defenses refuse to acknowledge some aspect of inner experience or outer reality, and can misattribute a problem to another source or reason, so that the person neither recognizes a part in causing it nor considers how to deal with it. Within the immature defenses, rationalization falls among the “non-depressive” defenses with denial, autistic fantasy, omnipotence and idealization[9].
The scales add detail about its function. The concealed motive may be selfish, but it may also involve caring or loving feelings that the person finds uncomfortable. The reasons given commonly have nothing to do with personal satisfaction, which disguises the real impulse even though related feeling may still show[9]. Critics of a recent theory of rationalization cite clinical and forensic research associating it with poorer emotional development and with a range of antisocial behavior, as evidence that it is a suboptimal defense[13].
Self-justification and dissonance
Social psychology has studied self-justification mainly through cognitive dissonance theory. In Leon Festinger’s account[5], a person who privately believes one thing but has publicly said the opposite holds two cognitions that do not fit together; the more reasons, rewards or pressures support the statement, the smaller the dissonance, and changing the private opinion is one way to reduce it[12]. Dissonance is experienced as psychological discomfort, which such attitude change relieves[6]. The experimental history of that idea, including the effort-justification and induced-compliance studies and their replication problems, is set out in the entry on cognitive dissonance. A replication of the induced-compliance paradigm in 39 laboratories found no difference in attitude between high-choice and low-choice conditions, although writing a counterattitudinal essay did shift attitudes compared with writing a neutral one[7].
Two lines of work extend the idea. Moral rationalization, the reinterpretation of one’s own immoral actions as moral, has been proposed as a process that arises from a conflict of motives and a need to see oneself as moral, and that can combine with situational factors obscuring moral relevance to produce serious wrongdoing[14]. Rationalization can also anticipate events. Before the 2000 U.S. presidential election, and in a study of tuition changes, people judged outcomes as more desirable the more likely they believed them to be, whether the outcomes were favorable or unfavorable. The effect appeared only when people were motivationally involved, and the authors called it sour grapes and sweet lemons[4].
Reasons given after the fact
A separate body of research shows how readily people explain behavior with reasons that did not cause it. Nisbett and Wilson reviewed evidence that people may have little or no direct introspective access to the processes behind their responses. When asked why they acted, they draw on implicit theories about what would plausibly cause such a response, so their reports are accurate only when the real influence happens to be salient and plausible[1]. In moral judgment, Haidt argued that reasoning is usually a post hoc construction produced after an intuitive judgment has been reached[2].
Motivated reasoning adds a constraint. Kunda proposed that the wish to reach a particular conclusion biases how people access, construct and evaluate beliefs, but that their ability to reach desired conclusions is limited by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for them[3]. On this account, rationalization is not unlimited: a conclusion is adopted when a plausible case for it can be made.
Defense, error or useful fiction
These findings establish that post hoc and self-serving explanation occurs readily in normal populations, but they leave open what rationalization is for. Cushman has argued that rationalization is rational in a specific sense. A person constructs the beliefs and desires that would have made an action rational and then adopts them; this extracts implicit information from habits, instincts and norms that do not follow rational choice, and can improve later reasoning. He calls the result a useful fiction[8]. Brody and Costa reply that clinical and forensic evidence supports viewing rationalization as a quite suboptimal defense mechanism[13].
What remains unsupported is the specifically psychoanalytic claim. These findings show that people give incorrect reasons and favor convenient conclusions; they rarely show that the reasons are produced to keep a particular unacceptable motive out of awareness. The people in the studies Nisbett and Wilson reviewed were sometimes unaware of what influenced them, but nothing in that evidence requires a defensive motive[1]. Dissonance research supplies such a motive, discomfort at inconsistency, yet some of its central paradigms have not replicated[7]. Clinical ratings of rationalization rest on an observer’s judgment that a stated reason is incorrect and a hidden motive is evident[9], and none of these studies tests that judgment against an independent measure of the hidden motive.
Sources14
Numbered in order of first citation.
- 1.Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231–259. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.84.3.231
- 2.Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814–834. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814
- 3.Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108(3), 480–498. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480
- 4.Kay, A. C., Jimenez, M. C., & Jost, J. T. (2002). Sour grapes, sweet lemons, and the anticipatory rationalization of the status quo. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(9), 1300–1312. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672022812014
- 5.Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Row, Peterson.
- 6.Elliot, A. J., & Devine, P. G. (1994). On the motivational nature of cognitive dissonance: Dissonance as psychological discomfort. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(3), 382–394. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.3.382
- 7.Vaidis, D. C., Sleegers, W. W. A., van Leeuwen, F., DeMarree, K. G., Sætrevik, B., Ross, R. M., Schmidt, K., Protzko, J., Morvinski, C., Ghasemi, O., Roberts, A. J., Stone, J., Bran, A., Gourdon-Kanhukamwe, A., Gunsoy, C., Moussaoui, L. S., Smith, A. R., Nugier, A., Fayant, M.-P., … Priolo, D. (2024). A multilab replication of the induced-compliance paradigm of cognitive dissonance. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 7(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/25152459231213375
- 8.Cushman, F. (2020). Rationalization is rational. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 43. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x19001730
- 9.Di Giuseppe, M., & Perry, J. C. (2021). The hierarchy of defense mechanisms: Assessing defensive functioning with the Defense Mechanisms Rating Scales Q-Sort. Frontiers in Psychology, 12. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.718440
- 10.Jones, E. (1908). Rationalization in every-day life. The Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 3(3), 161–169. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0070692
- 11.Baumeister, R. F., Dale, K., & Sommer, K. L. (1998). Freudian defense mechanisms and empirical findings in modern social psychology: Reaction formation, projection, displacement, undoing, isolation, sublimation, and denial. Journal of Personality, 66(6), 1081–1124. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6494.00043
- 12.Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58(2), 203–210. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0041593
- 13.Brody, S., & Costa, R. M. (2020). Rationalization is a suboptimal defense mechanism associated with clinical and forensic problems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 43. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002073
- 14.Tsang, J.-A. (2002). Moral rationalization and the integration of situational factors and psychological processes in immoral behavior. Review of General Psychology, 6(1), 25–50. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.6.1.25
Further reading
- Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108(3), 480–498. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480
- Cushman, F. (2020). Rationalization is rational. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 43. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x19001730
Related entries 12
- Defense mechanismsConcept
- Cognitive dissonanceConcept
- Anna FreudFigure
- Projection (psychology)Concept
- Displacement (psychology)Concept
- Reaction formationConcept
- Leon FestingerFigure
- Denial (defense mechanism)Concept
- Projection vs displacementComparison
- GroupthinkConcept
- Motivated reasoningConcept
- Self-serving biasConcept
Cite this entry
APA 7
Psych Dictionary. (2026, October 19). Rationalization. In Psych Dictionary. https://www.psychdictionary.com/concepts/rationalization
MLA 9
“Rationalization.” Psych Dictionary, 19 Oct. 2026, www.psychdictionary.com/concepts/rationalization.