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Psych Dictionary

Repression

  • Concept · Psychoanalysis and memory research
  • Mixed or contested
  • Published October 19, 2026
  • 24 sources
  • 5 min read

In short

Repression is the defense mechanism, central to Freud’s theory, by which a disturbing wish, feeling, thought or memory is kept out of conscious awareness without the person recognizing that anything is being excluded.
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Key facts

Field
Psychoanalysis and memory research
Originators
Sigmund Freud
First described
1890s
Also known as
Repression (psychology); Psychological repression; Freudian repression

State of the evidence

Mixed or contested

Freud’s account rests on clinical observation and has been revised and disputed ever since[1][2]. A laboratory analog, suppression-induced forgetting in the think/no-think task, shows a small aggregate effect across 120 studies[3], but some replications have failed and its value as a model of repression is questioned[4][5]. Whether traumatic memories can be blocked from awareness and later recovered accurately remains contested between researchers[6][7].

Evidence labels summarise the research literature; they are not recommendations. How labels are assigned

Repression, in psychoanalytic theory, is the defensive exclusion from consciousness of mental contents that would be unbearable to acknowledge, such as a wish, a feeling, a thought or a memory[2]. In the observer-rated definition used in defense research, the person may still experience the feeling or impulse while the idea attached to it stays out of awareness[8]. Three neighboring ideas are often confused with it: suppression, which is deliberate; motivated forgetting as studied in the laboratory; and the claim that traumatic memories can be blocked for years and then recovered.

Freud’s theory of repression

The word was not Freud’s. The philosopher Johann Herbart used it for the non-defensive inhibition of one idea by another; Freud adapted it to the defensive inhibition of “unbearable” mental contents[2]. Loftus describes repression as one of the foundation stones of psychoanalysis[9].

Freud’s theory changed over his career. Boag distinguishes his original account of 1893 to 1897, which he later superseded, from the theory of mature psychoanalysis developed between 1900 and 1940[1]. In the later work, Freud distinguished primary from secondary repression, a distinction that first appears in a 1910 letter to Sándor Ferenczi and was published in the Schreber case study[10]. When Freud introduced the id, ego and superego, the superego added a moral dimension to the account. His new theory of anxiety made the perception of threat central: signal anxiety arises when an event resembling an original trauma threatens to bring back a state of helplessness[11]. Boag also reads Freud’s references to repression as a “turning away” from distressing stimuli, a form of selective inattention that places repression within ordinary psychological functioning[12].

Boag argues that mainstream psychology has fixed on Freud’s early, superseded theory and reduced repression to the motivated forgetting of trauma, and that this misreading has distorted both tests of the theory and the recovered-memory debate[1].

Repression and suppression

The usual distinction turns on intention and accessibility. In Perry’s rating system, suppression is the voluntary, temporary avoidance of thinking about a disturbing problem, wish, feeling or experience; the material is postponed rather than forgotten and can readily be called back into awareness[8]. Repression, by contrast, keeps the idea out of awareness while its emotional elements are still experienced[8]. The two sit at different levels of the same scale: suppression among the high-adaptive defenses, repression at the neurotic level[8].

Not everyone accepts the line. Erdelyi argues that the distinction between repression and suppression is a false one imposed by fragmented clinical and laboratory traditions, and that the mechanism should be separated instead from the uses to which it is put, defense being only one[2].

Place among the defenses

Repression was the starting point for the wider concept of defense. Freud’s clinical work showed that material could be kept from consciousness not only by simple inhibition but by a variety of distorting techniques, which were eventually grouped together as defense mechanisms, “repression in the widest sense”[2]. The classification of the defenses, and repression’s place among them, is covered in defense mechanisms.

Motivated forgetting in the laboratory

Experimental psychology studies a related but distinct process. In the think/no-think task, participants learn pairs of words; later, shown the first word of a pair, they are told either to think of its partner or to keep it out of mind, and recall is then compared with pairs that were not practiced[4]. Anderson and Green found that repeatedly preventing a word from entering awareness made it harder to recall later, and proposed this executive control process as a model of repression that does not depend on trauma[13]. The task studies deliberate suppression in healthy volunteers, not the unconscious exclusion Freud described.

The think/no-think procedure (schematic)A schematic of a laboratory procedure, read from top to bottom in three phases. Study: participants learn pairs of words. Then three kinds of pair, side by side. Think: shown the first word, participants think of its partner. No-think, highlighted: shown the first word, they keep its partner out of mind. Not practiced: pairs left out of this phase, for comparison. A bracket joins all three kinds of pair and leads to two tests. The standard recall test compares recall of each kind of pair with the pairs not practiced. Recall with new cues is the condition that most directly indicates inhibition. A note says that Anderson and Green found that repeatedly preventing a word from entering awareness made it harder to recall later.A LABORATORY MODEL OF SUPPRESSION-INDUCED FORGETTING1 · STUDYStudyParticipants learn pairs of words2 · THINK AND NO-THINK TRIALSThinkShown the first word,think of its partnerNo-thinkShown the first word,keep its partner outof mindNot practicedPairs left out ofthis phase, forcomparison3 · RECALL TESTSStandard recall testRecall of each kind of paircompared with the pairs notpracticedRecall with new cuesThe condition that most directlyindicates inhibitionAnderson and Green found that repeatedly preventing a word fromentering awareness made it harder to recall later.

Figure 1A laboratory model of suppression-induced forgetting: after learning word pairs, participants either think of a word’s partner or keep it out of mind, and recall is compared with pairs not practiced. It studies deliberate suppression in healthy volunteers and is not a test of Freudian repression, the unconscious exclusion Freud described. After Anderson and Green (2001), with the procedure as described by Wiechert and colleagues (2023).

Text description

A schematic of a laboratory procedure, read from top to bottom in three phases. Study: participants learn pairs of words. Then three kinds of pair, side by side. Think: shown the first word, participants think of its partner. No-think, highlighted: shown the first word, they keep its partner out of mind. Not practiced: pairs left out of this phase, for comparison. A bracket joins all three kinds of pair and leads to two tests. The standard recall test compares recall of each kind of pair with the pairs not practiced. Recall with new cues is the condition that most directly indicates inhibition. A note says that Anderson and Green found that repeatedly preventing a word from entering awareness made it harder to recall later.

The effect is small and variable. A 2026 meta-analysis of 500 effects from 120 studies found a consistent aggregate effect (d of about 0.20 to 0.40), corresponding to about 6% less recall on the standard test, with substantial heterogeneity. The effect was larger with more suppression trials and with autobiographical memories than with words or images[3]. An earlier focused meta-analysis found a small to moderate effect in healthy people that may be inflated by publication bias, a smaller effect in anxious and depressed people, and a larger one in people with a repressive coping style[14].

Replications have been uneven. Three experiments designed to replicate the original finding showed no reliable suppression effect[15], and a pre-registered online replication with 150 participants found effects close to zero[4]. A reanalysis of early unpublished replications found that recall tested with new cues, the condition that most directly indicates inhibition, mostly showed no effect[16]. Reviewing that literature, Wessel concluded that it is questionable whether suppression-induced forgetting provides a viable model of repression[5].

The recovered-memory controversy

By the early 1990s, reports of memories of childhood sexual abuse said to have been repressed for decades were being used in lawsuits, raising questions about how common such forgetting is and how authentic the recovered memories are[9]. The dispute that followed, often called the memory wars, has two lines of evidence.

Some evidence shows that documented abuse can go unreported for long periods. In a prospective study of 129 women with documented histories of childhood sexual abuse, 38% did not recall the abuse when interviewed 17 years later; women abused at a younger age or by someone they knew were more likely to report no memory[17]. In another study, continuous memories of abuse and discontinuous memories recalled unexpectedly outside therapy were more often corroborated than memories recovered in therapy, which suggested that spontaneously recovered memories may be accurate while expectations created by therapy may produce false ones[18].

Other evidence shows that suggestion can create memories of events that never happened. A mega-analysis of eight implantation studies classified 30.4% of 423 cases as false memories[19]. A systematic review using a stricter definition found that some recollective experience was induced in 47% of participants but full memories in only 15%, and concluded that susceptibility is more limited than often suggested[20].

The researchers disagree about how live the problem is. Otgaar and colleagues argue that belief in repressed memories remains widespread, that dissociative amnesia functions as a substitute term for repression, and that some therapies risk producing false recovered memories[6]. Brewin replied that the established consensus is that recovered memories may be genuine, false or a mixture; that the major publications on repressed memories he identified did not endorse a theory of unconscious repression; and that recovered memories occur in many forms of therapy, including ones that use no suggestive techniques[7]. Otgaar and colleagues answered with further evidence that students and some clinicians endorse unconscious repressed memory[21]. Surveys show mainstream clinicians less believing than in the 1990s but still less skeptical than research psychologists and memory experts[22], while one set of studies found that lay people tended to use the term repression in ways consistent with the scientific evidence[23]. A representative UK survey found that 3.6% of adults reported recovering memories of previously unknown abuse during therapy[24]. On one practical point the two sides converge: Brewin describes suggestive therapy and attempts to exhume memories as hazardous and generally inappropriate[7], and Otgaar and colleagues warn of false accusations of abuse[21].

Sources24

Numbered in order of first citation.

  1. 1.Boag, S. (2006). Freudian repression, the common view, and pathological science. Review of General Psychology, 10(1), 74–86. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.10.1.74
  2. 2.Erdelyi, M. H. (2006). The unified theory of repression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29(5), 499–511. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X06009113
  3. 3.Clark, C. A., Todorovic, D., Levy, B. J., Eschmann, K. C. J., Klein, M. D., Anderson, M. C., van Schie, K., Whitridge, J., Yick, J., & Fawcett, J. M. (2026). Forgetting as a consequence of retrieval suppression: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 155(5), 1318–1346. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001922
  4. 4.Wiechert, S., Loewy, L., Wessel, I., Fawcett, J. M., Ben-Shakhar, G., Pertzov, Y., & Verschuere, B. (2023). Suppression-induced forgetting: a pre-registered replication of the think/no-think paradigm. Memory, 31(7), 989–1002. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2023.2208791
  5. 5.Wessel, I. (2024). Suppression‐induced forgetting as a model for repression. Topics in Cognitive Science, 16(4), 731–751. https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12684
  6. 6.Otgaar, H., Howe, M. L., Patihis, L., Merckelbach, H., Lynn, S. J., Lilienfeld, S. O., & Loftus, E. F. (2019). The return of the repressed: The persistent and problematic claims of long-forgotten trauma. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 14(6), 1072–1095. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691619862306
  7. 7.Brewin, C. R. (2021). Tilting at windmills: Why attacks on repression are misguided. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 16(2), 443–453. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691620927674
  8. 8.Di Giuseppe, M., & Perry, J. C. (2021). The hierarchy of defense mechanisms: Assessing defensive functioning with the Defense Mechanisms Rating Scales Q-Sort. Frontiers in Psychology, 12. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.718440
  9. 9.Loftus, E. F. (1993). The reality of repressed memories. American Psychologist, 48(5), 518–537. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.48.5.518
  10. 10.Boag, S. (2018). Repression in the topographic model. In Freudian Repression, the Unconscious, and the Dynamics of Inhibition (pp. 21–38). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429475023-2
  11. 11.Boag, S. (2018). The structural theory and repression. In Freudian Repression, the Unconscious, and the Dynamics of Inhibition (pp. 39–50). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429475023-3
  12. 12.Boag, S. (2018). A psychobiological account of Freudian repression. In Freudian Repression, the Unconscious, and the Dynamics of Inhibition (pp. 185–204). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429475023-12
  13. 13.Anderson, M. C., & Green, C. (2001). Suppressing unwanted memories by executive control. Nature, 410(6826), 366–369. https://doi.org/10.1038/35066572
  14. 14.Stramaccia, D. F., Meyer, A. K., Rischer, K. M., Fawcett, J. M., & Benoit, R. G. (2021). Memory suppression and its deficiency in psychological disorders: A focused meta-analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 150(5), 828–850. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000971
  15. 15.Bulevich, J. B., Roediger HL 3rd, Balota, D. A., & Butler, A. C. (2006). Failures to find suppression of episodic memories in the think/no-think paradigm. Memory & Cognition, 34(8), 1569–1577. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03195920
  16. 16.Wessel, I., Albers, C. J., Zandstra, A. R. E., & Heininga, V. E. (2020). A multiverse analysis of early attempts to replicate memory suppression with the Think/No-think Task. Memory, 28(7), 870–887. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2020.1797095
  17. 17.Williams, L. M. (1994). Recall of childhood trauma: A prospective study of women's memories of child sexual abuse. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 62(6), 1167–1176. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-006x.62.6.1167
  18. 18.Geraerts, E., Schooler, J. W., Merckelbach, H., Jelicic, M., Hauer, B. J., & Ambadar, Z. (2007). The reality of recovered memories. Psychological Science, 18(7), 564–568. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01940.x
  19. 19.Scoboria, A., Wade, K. A., Lindsay, D. S., Azad, T., Strange, D., Ost, J., & Hyman, I. E. (2017). A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false memory implantation studies. Memory, 25(2), 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2016.1260747
  20. 20.Brewin, C. R., & Andrews, B. (2017). Creating memories for false autobiographical events in childhood: A systematic review. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 31(1), 2–23. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3220
  21. 21.Otgaar, H., Howe, M. L., Dodier, O., Lilienfeld, S. O., Loftus, E. F., Lynn, S. J., Merckelbach, H., & Patihis, L. (2021). Belief in unconscious repressed memory persists. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 16(2), 454–460. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691621990628
  22. 22.Patihis, L., Ho, L. Y., Tingen, I. W., Lilienfeld, S. O., & Loftus, E. F. (2014). Are the “memory wars” over? A scientist-practitioner gap in beliefs about repressed memory. Psychological Science, 25(2), 519–530. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613510718
  23. 23.Brewin, C. R., Li, H., Ntarantana, V., Unsworth, C., & McNeilis, J. (2019). Is the public understanding of memory prone to widespread “myths”?. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 148(12), 2245–2257. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000610
  24. 24.Patihis, L. (2026). Client-reported prevalence of repressed memory recovery in therapy: a representative U.K. sample. Memory, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2026.2714175

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Written by Editorial team. First published October 19, 2026. Editorial standards

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