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Psych Dictionary

Repression vs suppression

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  • Published October 19, 2026
  • 16 sources
  • 6 min read

In short

Repression is the unconscious exclusion of disturbing material from awareness; suppression is the deliberate, temporary decision not to think about it. Defense research ranks them at different levels, and experimental psychology studies deliberate suppression, sometimes as a model of repression.
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Key facts

Compares
Repression

Definition

Repression
Being unable to remember or be cognitively aware of disturbing wishes, feelings, thoughts or experiences
Suppression
Voluntarily and temporarily avoiding thinking about a disturbing problem, wish, feeling or experience

Intention

Repression
Not deliberate; the person does not recognize that anything is being excluded
Suppression
Deliberate; the person decides to set the material aside

What stays in awareness

Repression
The feeling or impulse may still be experienced while the idea attached to it stays out of awareness
Suppression
The person knows what has been set aside; distressing feelings are acknowledged and dealing with them is postponed

Later recall

Repression
The material cannot be called back at will
Suppression
The material can readily be called back, since it is not forgotten

Place in defense hierarchies

Repression
Neurotic level in Perry’s Defense Mechanism Rating Scales
Suppression
High-adaptive level in Perry’s scales; the mature end of the DSM-IV Defensive Function Scale

Laboratory research

Repression
Retrieval suppression in the think/no-think task has been proposed as a model, a use that is disputed
Suppression
Studied directly as thought suppression and retrieval suppression, both deliberate

Characteristic finding

Repression
Suppression-induced forgetting is small and variable across studies
Suppression
Trying not to think a thought produces a small-to-moderate rebound in its frequency

Repression and suppression are two ways of keeping disturbing mental content out of mind. Repression is the exclusion of a wish, feeling, thought or memory from awareness without the person recognizing that anything is being excluded; suppression is the deliberate, temporary decision not to think about it[1][2]. The difference is one of intention and of later access: suppressed material can be brought back at will, and repressed material cannot.

The two words cross over in research. Psychoanalytic defense research treats them as separate defenses at different levels of maturity. Experimental psychology studies deliberate suppression, and one line of that work offers suppression as a laboratory model of repression. This entry sets the definitions side by side and summarizes how each experimental literature relates to them; Freud’s theory, the recovered-memory controversy and the replication record of the memory experiments are covered in the entry on repression.

Awareness, intention and recall

The clearest operational definitions come from Perry’s Defense Mechanism Rating Scales, an observer-rated system whose manual defines 30 defenses. Suppression there is the voluntary, temporary avoidance of thinking about disturbing problems, wishes, feelings or experiences: putting things out of mind until the right time to deal with them, a form of postponing that the definition distinguishes from procrastinating. The person can readily call the material back, since it is not forgotten. Distressing feelings are acknowledged, but dealing with them is postponed until the person feels more able or the timing is more appropriate[2]. One rating item describes a person who, feeling a desire that would have bad consequences if acted on, decides consciously to put the desire aside[2].

Repression in the same system is the inability to remember or be cognitively aware of disturbing wishes, feelings, thoughts or experiences. The emotional elements may be clearly present and experienced while the idea associated with them stays outside consciousness[2]. Rating items describe a person who keeps unpleasant things vague, has trouble recalling specific examples when some should be forthcoming, or loses memory for whole periods of time[2].

Read together, the definitions differ on three points. Suppression is chosen and repression is not; suppression sets aside both the idea and the feeling while the person knows what has been set aside, whereas repression removes the idea while the feeling may remain; and suppressed material returns on demand. The definitions add that suppression minimizes neurotic anxiety because the material is not repressed, although anticipatory anxiety may remain until the stressor is dealt with[2].

Rank among the defenses

Perry’s scales order the 30 defenses into seven levels and put suppression at the high-adaptive level, with affiliation, altruism, anticipation, humor, self-assertion, self-observation and sublimation, and repression at the neurotic level, with dissociation, reaction formation and displacement[2]. George Vaillant likewise placed suppression among the defenses at the mature end of the DSM-IV Defensive Function Scale, which he linked to positive psychology, and reported evidence that the maturity of a person’s defenses is largely independent of social class, education and IQ[3]. The full classification is described under defense mechanisms.

Thought suppression and its rebound

Social psychology studies suppression as an act of mental control. In Daniel Wegner’s first experiments, participants who spoke their stream of consciousness aloud for five minutes were asked not to think of a white bear and to ring a bell whenever they did. They could not suppress the thought as instructed, and when later asked to think about the bear, they did so more often than participants who had been asked to think about it from the start. A second experiment replicated the rebound and found that participants given a specific distracter thought during suppression showed less later preoccupation[4].

Wegner’s ironic process theory explains the pattern with two processes. An operating process searches for mental contents consistent with the intended state, and a monitoring process searches for contents that would signal failure. Under conditions that reduce mental capacity, the monitoring process can prevail and increase sensitivity to the very thought being avoided[5]. A review of research spanning emotions, memory, interpersonal processes, psychophysiological reactions and psychopathology described thought suppression as a popular form of mental control that can be counterproductive[6].

The size of the effect is modest. A meta-analysis of controlled studies found a small to moderate rebound that varied with the kind of target thought and with how thought frequency was measured. Participants with clinical diagnoses did not show larger rebounds than other participants, although few studies included clinical samples[7]. A later meta-analysis found no overall difference in the recurrence of suppressed thoughts between groups with and without psychopathology, and relatively less recurrence in samples with symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder, differences its authors described as typically small and as giving only mixed support to existing theories[8].

Retrieval suppression as a model of repression

A second experimental tradition gives suppression a different result. In the think/no-think task, participants are shown a reminder and asked to keep the associated memory from coming to mind. Anderson and Green reported that consistently preventing a memory from entering awareness made it harder to recall later, that the forgetting increased with the number of times the memory was avoided and resisted incentives for accurate recall, and that it was caused by processes acting on the memory itself. They concluded that executive control processes not uniquely tied to trauma may provide a viable model for repression[9]. A later review describes a core discovery of this research as the top-down control that the prefrontal cortex exerts over activity in the hippocampus and other memory structures, often through inhibition[10].

The two laboratory traditions therefore reach different conclusions about deliberate suppression. Thought suppression over a period of minutes is followed by a rebound; repeated retrieval suppression in response to a reminder is followed by some forgetting. The tasks, the instructions and the measures differ, and in both traditions specific instructions matter: a distracter thought reduced rebound in Wegner’s experiments[4], and specific instructions to suppress retrieval directly or to substitute another thought produced larger forgetting in healthy participants[11].

Whether retrieval suppression models repression is disputed. The task was designed to test the deliberate avoidance of retrieving a memory[12], which corresponds to suppression in the clinical definitions rather than to repression. A 2026 meta-analysis of 120 studies found a consistent but modest forgetting effect with substantial heterogeneity[13], while a review of the tests most diagnostic of inhibition concluded that it is questionable whether suppression-induced forgetting provides a viable model of repression[12]. The full replication record is summarized in the entry on repression.

Repression and suppression by intention and laboratory procedureA grid. The columns are the two laboratory procedures: thought suppression, trying not to think a thought, as in Wegner’s white bear experiments; and retrieval suppression, keeping a memory from coming to mind, in the think/no-think task. The first row is deliberate, where suppression sits in Perry’s scales, at the high-adaptive level. In it, thought suppression is followed by a small-to-moderate rebound in the frequency of the suppressed thought, and retrieval suppression by suppression-induced forgetting, small and variable across studies. The second row is not deliberate, where repression sits in Perry’s scales, at the neurotic level. It has one dashed cell spanning both columns: no procedure of its own, because both tasks instruct deliberate suppression; retrieval suppression has been proposed as a model of repression, a use that is disputed.ThoughtsuppressionTrying not to think athought, as inWegner’s white bearexperimentsRetrievalsuppressionKeeping a memory fromcoming to mind, in thethink/no-think taskDeliberateSuppression, in Perry’s scales: high-adaptivelevelReboundA small-to-moderaterebound in thefrequency of thesuppressed thoughtForgettingSuppression-inducedforgetting, small andvariable acrossstudiesNot deliberateRepression, in Perry’s scales: neurotic levelNo procedure of its ownBoth tasks instruct deliberate suppression.Retrieval suppression has been proposed as amodel of repression, a use that is disputed

Figure 1Both laboratory procedures, thought suppression and retrieval suppression, are deliberate, which is where Perry’s scales place suppression; repression, which is not deliberate, has no procedure of its own, and the use of retrieval suppression as a model of it is disputed. After Di Giuseppe and Perry (2021), Wegner and colleagues (1987), Anderson and Green (2001) and Wessel (2024).

Text description

A grid. The columns are the two laboratory procedures: thought suppression, trying not to think a thought, as in Wegner’s white bear experiments; and retrieval suppression, keeping a memory from coming to mind, in the think/no-think task. The first row is deliberate, where suppression sits in Perry’s scales, at the high-adaptive level. In it, thought suppression is followed by a small-to-moderate rebound in the frequency of the suppressed thought, and retrieval suppression by suppression-induced forgetting, small and variable across studies. The second row is not deliberate, where repression sits in Perry’s scales, at the neurotic level. It has one dashed cell spanning both columns: no procedure of its own, because both tasks instruct deliberate suppression; retrieval suppression has been proposed as a model of repression, a use that is disputed.

Repressive coping as a personality style

Personality research uses “repression” in a third sense. People with a repressive coping style combine low self-reported trait anxiety with high defensiveness. Their low reported anxiety contrasts with high behavioral and physiological indicators of anxiety, and the vigilance–avoidance theory proposes that they first attend rapidly to threat and then shift to avoidant biases in attention, interpretation and memory that inhibit the conscious experience of anxiety[14].

The style is identified by questionnaire, not by observing repression, but it connects the two concepts experimentally. In think/no-think studies, individuals with a stronger repressive coping style showed more suppression-induced forgetting than other participants[11]. In research on projection, people who both avoided thinking about having threatening traits and denied having them readily inferred those traits in others, and participants asked not to think about an unfavorable trait attributed to them later projected it onto someone else[15].

A boundary in dispute

Not all theorists accept the distinction. Erdelyi argues that the line between repression and suppression is a false one, imposed by fragmented clinical and laboratory traditions, and that the more useful distinction is between the inhibitory mechanism and the uses to which it is put, defense being only one[1]. Boag argues from the other direction that mainstream psychology has reduced Freud’s theory to the motivated forgetting of trauma, ignoring the mature theory developed after 1900, which distorts attempts to test it[16]. On either view, experiments on deliberate suppression bear on repression only through a theory of how the two are related.

Sources16

Numbered in order of first citation.

  1. 1.Erdelyi, M. H. (2006). The unified theory of repression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29(5), 499–511. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X06009113
  2. 2.Di Giuseppe, M., & Perry, J. C. (2021). The hierarchy of defense mechanisms: Assessing defensive functioning with the Defense Mechanisms Rating Scales Q-Sort. Frontiers in Psychology, 12. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.718440
  3. 3.Vaillant, G. E. (2000). Adaptive mental mechanisms: Their role in a positive psychology. American Psychologist, 55(1), 89–98. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.89
  4. 4.Wegner, D. M., Schneider, D. J., Carter, S. R., & White, T. L. (1987). Paradoxical effects of thought suppression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53(1), 5–13. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.53.1.5
  5. 5.Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychological Review, 101(1), 34–52. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.101.1.34
  6. 6.Wenzlaff, R. M., & Wegner, D. M. (2000). Thought suppression. Annual Review of Psychology, 51(1), 59–91. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.59
  7. 7.Abramowitz, J. S., Tolin, D. F., & Street, G. P. (2001). Paradoxical effects of thought suppression: A meta-analysis of controlled studies. Clinical Psychology Review, 21(5), 683–703. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0272-7358(00)00057-X
  8. 8.Magee, J. C., Harden, K. P., & Teachman, B. A. (2012). Psychopathology and thought suppression: A quantitative review. Clinical Psychology Review, 32(3), 189–201. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2012.01.001
  9. 9.Anderson, M. C., & Green, C. (2001). Suppressing unwanted memories by executive control. Nature, 410(6826), 366–369. https://doi.org/10.1038/35066572
  10. 10.Anderson, M. C., & Hulbert, J. C. (2021). Active forgetting: Adaptation of memory by prefrontal control. Annual Review of Psychology, 72(1), 1–36. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-072720-094140
  11. 11.Stramaccia, D. F., Meyer, A. K., Rischer, K. M., Fawcett, J. M., & Benoit, R. G. (2021). Memory suppression and its deficiency in psychological disorders: A focused meta-analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 150(5), 828–850. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000971
  12. 12.Wessel, I. (2024). Suppression‐induced forgetting as a model for repression. Topics in Cognitive Science, 16(4), 731–751. https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12684
  13. 13.Clark, C. A., Todorovic, D., Levy, B. J., Eschmann, K. C. J., Klein, M. D., Anderson, M. C., van Schie, K., Whitridge, J., Yick, J., & Fawcett, J. M. (2026). Forgetting as a consequence of retrieval suppression: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 155(5), 1318–1346. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001922
  14. 14.Derakshan, N., Eysenck, M. W., & Myers, L. B. (2007). Emotional information processing in repressors: The vigilance–avoidance theory. Cognition & Emotion, 21(8), 1585–1614. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930701499857
  15. 15.Newman, L. S., Duff, K. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (1997). A new look at defensive projection: Thought suppression, accessibility, and biased person perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(5), 980–1001. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.72.5.980
  16. 16.Boag, S. (2006). Freudian repression, the common view, and pathological science. Review of General Psychology, 10(1), 74–86. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.10.1.74

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