Unconscious mind
- Concept · Psychoanalytic theory and cognitive psychology
- Mixed or contested
- Published October 19, 2026
- 25 sources
- 5 min read
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Key facts
- Field
- Psychoanalytic theory and cognitive psychology
- Originators
- Sigmund Freud
- First described
- 1900 onward
- Also known as
- The unconscious; Dynamic unconscious; Cognitive unconscious; Preconscious; Topographic model
- Topics
- Psychoanalysis
State of the evidence
Mixed or contestedExperiments have established that perception, memory and action can be influenced by events a person cannot report, including implicit memory and automatic processes[1][2]. How sophisticated these processes are is disputed[3][4], and several well-known behavioral priming effects did not replicate[5][6], although a meta-analysis still finds a small average effect[7]. The findings support unconscious processing in general but do not test Freud’s dynamic unconscious, which is defined by motivated exclusion from awareness[8][3]. Freud’s topographic model itself was revised by Freud and is of historical standing[9].
Evidence labels summarise the research literature; they are not recommendations. How labels are assigned
The unconscious mind, in Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, is the part of mental life that is kept out of awareness yet still influences conscious thought and behavior. Freud held that repression creates a repository of thoughts and impulses of which a person remains unaware, and Sugarman calls the delineation of that repository his signature contribution to psychology[10]. In later experimental psychology the term has a wider and plainer meaning: any mental structure or process that affects experience, thought or action without being consciously perceived or remembered[1].
The two meanings differ in what keeps material out of awareness. Freud’s unconscious is dynamic: its contents are excluded by repression, a term introduced by Herbart that Freud adapted to mean the defensive inhibition of unbearable mental contents[8]. The cognitive unconscious of experimental psychology needs no such motive. Social cognition research defines an unconscious process by its unintentional nature[4], and cognitive research by automatization or by the absence of conscious perception or recollection[1]. Freud’s own classifications of the unconscious, as descriptive, dynamic or systematic, changed over his career, and Petocz describes his material on them as inconsistent and confusing[11].
Freud’s topographic model
Between 1897 and 1923 Freud described the mind with one or another version of the topographic model, so named because it set out a “topography” of the mind in strata that differ in quality and interact with one another[12]. His 1915 paper “The unconscious” justified the existence of the unconscious, mapped its characteristics and placed it within a topography of unconscious, preconscious and conscious processes. In it, consciousness is something like a sense organ that detects thought, which is itself unconscious[10]. Freud’s evidence included dreams, neurotic symptoms, slips and other small errors of daily life, thoughts that arrive from no identifiable source, and memories that hypnosis can reveal; he held that conscious processes account for only a small part of mental activity[10]. Slips are described under Freudian slip.
- Unconscious (system Ucs.)
The deepest system, made up of unsatisfied instinctual wishes that seek pleasurable discharge and relief of tension at all costs[13].
- Preconscious (system Pcs.)
The system between the unconscious and the conscious, which develops through the interaction of wishes with the external world, integrates and synthesizes, and is governed largely by the reality principle[14].
- Conscious (system Cs.)
The surface of the apparatus, where the quality of consciousness attaches to mental contents[15].
Censorship separates the systems. It operates across the whole range of the preconscious, stricter toward its surface and laxer at its depths[15], and the reality principle plays a major part in the “second censorship” between the preconscious and the conscious[14]. The rules by which the two kinds of system work, primary and secondary process, are described under pleasure principle.
Replacement by the structural model
Clinical experience exposed the model’s limits. Freud came to attribute dynamically unconscious properties to some contents of the preconscious, and he became increasingly aware that consciousness and unconsciousness alone could not serve as the basis for distinguishing the systems of the mind or its pathological states[9]. The structural model of 1923 introduced entities that were not defined by their relation to consciousness and placed more weight on the functions that delay and alter the expression of drives[16]. Its three agencies are described under id, ego and superego; the id corresponds roughly to much of what had been called the unconscious[17]. Even so, the topographic model was not completely replaced by the structural one[9].
The cognitive unconscious
Experimental psychology reached unconscious processes by a different route. A 1987 review in Science brought together evidence that skills become unconscious through practice and that subliminal perception, implicit memory and hypnosis allow events to affect mental functions even when they cannot be consciously perceived or remembered[1]. In the same review, Kihlstrom used “preconscious” in a cognitive sense, for knowledge structures that unconscious processes operate on[1].
Implicit memory is a central case. Memory for a recent event can be expressed explicitly, as conscious recollection, or implicitly, as easier performance on a task such as completing a word fragment, without any recollection of the earlier episode. Dissociations between the two have been documented across many tasks and populations[2]. Introspection has limits of its own: people may have little or no direct access to the processes that link a stimulus to their response, and when asked about them they appear to answer from implicit theories about what plausibly caused it[18].
Automaticity extends the argument to action. Bargh and Chartrand argued that the capacity for conscious, intentional control is limited, so that most moment-to-moment psychological life must run through nonconscious means[19]. Social cognition research describes several independent unconscious guidance systems, perceptual, evaluative and motivational, and holds that action precedes reflection in both evolution and development[4].
The priming replication controversy
One influential line of evidence came from behavioral priming, and a 1996 paper was instrumental in defining it[5]. In that paper, participants exposed to words related to rudeness interrupted an experimenter more quickly, participants primed with the elderly stereotype walked more slowly down a hallway, and participants subliminally primed with an African American stereotype reacted with more hostility to a vexing request[20].
Later attempts to reproduce such effects did not succeed. A replication of the walking study with automated timing and a larger sample found no priming effect. In a second experiment, the effect appeared only when experimenters believed participants would walk more slowly, and debriefing suggested that participants had noticed the primes[5]. Nine experiments with 475 participants failed to obtain the claimed effect of priming “professor” or similar concepts on general-knowledge performance, and a Bayesian analysis gave considerable support to the null hypothesis[6]. A broader critique argued that inadequate tests of awareness, unexamined artifacts and a readiness to accept intuitive conclusions had given unconscious influences inflated explanatory power in theories of decision making[21].
The literature is not uniformly negative. A meta-analysis of 352 effect sizes from 133 studies of incidentally presented words found a small behavioral priming effect (d = 0.35 under random effects), which its authors judged robust across methods and only minimally biased by selective publication[7].
What the experiments show about Freud’s unconscious
The experiments establish that much mental processing occurs outside awareness. Westen argued in 1999 that independent research literatures had documented the most fundamental tenet of psychoanalysis, that much of mental life, including cognitive, affective and motivational processes, is unconscious. He added that the same research suggests important revisions to the psychoanalytic account[22].
The experiments are less informative about the psychoanalytic version. Greenwald concluded that unconscious cognition is solidly established but intellectually much simpler than the sophisticated agency portrayed in psychoanalytic theory, while commentators in the same exchange agreed that unconscious processes are real and disagreed about how sophisticated they are[3][23]. Bargh and Morsella took the opposite side, arguing that the unconscious is not identifiably less flexible or complex than conscious processing[4]. Solms, working from neuroscience, proposes a different revision of Freud’s scheme: the cognitive systems Freud called perception–consciousness and preconscious are unconscious in themselves, and affect is a more ancient form of consciousness than perception[24]. The experimental literatures do not define their unconscious by the motive that defines Freud’s, the exclusion of unbearable content from awareness. Their closest analogs are experiments on attentional bias, thought avoidance and intentional forgetting[8], whose relation to Freud’s concept is described under repression. Boag argues that attempts to test Freud have often targeted his early theory of repression, which he himself superseded, rather than the mature theory[25].
Sources25
Numbered in order of first citation.
- 1.Kihlstrom, J. F. (1987). The cognitive unconscious. Science, 237(4821), 1445–1452. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.3629249
- 2.Schacter, D. L. (1987). Implicit memory: History and current status. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13(3), 501–518. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.13.3.501
- 3.Greenwald, A. G. (1992). New Look 3: Unconscious cognition reclaimed. American Psychologist, 47(6), 766–779. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.47.6.766
- 4.Bargh, J. A., & Morsella, E. (2008). The unconscious mind. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3(1), 73–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00064.x
- 5.Doyen, S., Klein, O., Pichon, C. L., & Cleeremans, A. (2012). Behavioral priming: It's all in the mind, but whose mind?. PLoS ONE, 7(1), e29081. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0029081
- 6.Shanks, D. R., Newell, B. R., Lee, E. H., Balakrishnan, D., Ekelund, L., Cenac, Z., Kavvadia, F., & Moore, C. (2013). Priming intelligent behavior: An elusive phenomenon. PLoS ONE, 8(4), e56515. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0056515
- 7.Weingarten, E., Chen, Q., McAdams, M., Yi, J., Hepler, J., & Albarracín, D. (2016). From primed concepts to action: A meta-analysis of the behavioral effects of incidentally presented words. Psychological Bulletin, 142(5), 472–497. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000030
- 8.Erdelyi, M. H. (2006). The unified theory of repression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29(5), 499–511. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X06009113
- 9.Sandler, J., Holder, A., Dare, C., Dreher, A. U., & Wallerstein, R. S. (2018). Limitations and transition to the structural model. In Freud's Models of the Mind (pp. 153–161). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429475061-12
- 10.Sugarman, S. (2016). The unconscious and the structure of the mind: “The unconscious” (1915c). In What Freud Really Meant (pp. 73–86). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316340240.008
- 11.Petocz, A. (1999). The problem of the ‘system unconscious’. In Freud, Psychoanalysis and Symbolism (pp. 151–177). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511583452.009
- 12.Sandler, J., Holder, A., Dare, C., Dreher, A. U., & Wallerstein, R. S. (2018). The organization of the mental apparatus. In Freud's Models of the Mind (pp. 57–71). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429475061-5
- 13.Sandler, J., Holder, A., Dare, C., Dreher, A. U., & Wallerstein, R. S. (2018). The system Unconscious. In Freud's Models of the Mind (pp. 72–81). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429475061-6
- 14.Sandler, J., Holder, A., Dare, C., Dreher, A. U., & Wallerstein, R. S. (2018). The system Preconscious. In Freud's Models of the Mind (pp. 82–95). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429475061-7
- 15.Sandler, J., Holder, A., Dare, C., Dreher, A. U., & Wallerstein, R. S. (2018). The system Conscious. In Freud's Models of the Mind (pp. 96–100). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429475061-8
- 16.Sandler, J., Holder, A., Dare, C., Dreher, A. U., & Wallerstein, R. S. (2018). Characteristics. In Freud's Models of the Mind (pp. 165–171). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429475061-13
- 17.Diem-Wille, G. (2021). Is the death instinct silent or clinically relevant? From Freud’s concept of a silent death instinct to understanding its clinical manifestations. In Psychoanalysis - A New Overview. IntechOpen. https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.94444
- 18.Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231–259. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.84.3.231
- 19.Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. American Psychologist, 54(7), 462–479. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.462
- 20.Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effects of trait construct and stereotype activation on action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(2), 230–244. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.230
- 21.Newell, B. R., & Shanks, D. R. (2014). Unconscious influences on decision making: A critical review. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X12003214
- 22.Westen, D. (1999). The scientific status of unconscious processes: Is Freud really dead?. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 47(4), 1061–1106. https://doi.org/10.1177/000306519904700404
- 23.Loftus, E. F., & Klinger, M. R. (1992). Is the unconscious smart or dumb?. American Psychologist, 47(6), 761–765. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.47.6.761
- 24.Solms, M. (2018). “The unconscious” in psychoanalysis and neuroscience: An integrated approach to the cognitive unconscious. In Unrepressed Unconscious, Implicit Memory, and Clinical Work (pp. 1–25). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429484629-1
- 25.Boag, S. (2006). Freudian repression, the common view, and pathological science. Review of General Psychology, 10(1), 74–86. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.10.1.74
Further reading
- Sugarman, S. (2016). The unconscious and the structure of the mind: “The unconscious” (1915c). In What Freud Really Meant (pp. 73–86). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316340240.008
- Westen, D. (1999). The scientific status of unconscious processes: Is Freud really dead?. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 47(4), 1061–1106. https://doi.org/10.1177/000306519904700404
- Kihlstrom, J. F. (1987). The cognitive unconscious. Science, 237(4821), 1445–1452. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.3629249
Related entries 16
- Id, ego and superegoConcept
- RepressionConcept
- Freudian slipConcept
- Sigmund FreudFigure
- Defense mechanismsConcept
- Pleasure principleConcept
- PsychoanalysisTopic
- Freud vs JungComparison
- CathexisConcept
- Denial (defense mechanism)Concept
- Halo effectConcept
- Implicit biasConcept
- Replication crisisConcept
- Free associationMethod
- Art therapyTherapy
- Intensive short-term dynamic psychotherapy(ISTDP)Therapy
Cite this entry
APA 7
Psych Dictionary. (2026, October 19). Unconscious mind. In Psych Dictionary. https://www.psychdictionary.com/concepts/unconscious-mind
MLA 9
“Unconscious Mind.” Psych Dictionary, 19 Oct. 2026, www.psychdictionary.com/concepts/unconscious-mind.