Cognitive dissonance
- Concept · Social psychology
- Mixed or contested
- Published October 18, 2026
- 21 sources
- 6 min read
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Key facts
- Field
- Social psychology
- Originators
- Leon Festinger
- First described
- 1957, United States
- Also known as
- Cognitive dissonance theory; Dissonance theory
- Topics
- Social psychology
State of the evidence
Mixed or contestedDissonance theory has generated a large experimental literature[1], and experiments support its core claim that freely chosen counterattitudinal behavior produces discomfort which attitude change relieves[2]. Its classic paradigms have serious problems, however. The free-choice paradigm can produce its signature effect without any change in preference, and studies that correct the flaw find a small effect (d = 0.26)[3][4]. A replication of the induced-compliance paradigm in 39 laboratories found no difference between high-choice and low-choice conditions[5].
Evidence labels summarise the research literature; they are not recommendations. How labels are assigned
Cognitive dissonance is the uncomfortable state that arises when a person holds two cognitions that do not fit together, and the motivation to reduce it. Leon Festinger proposed the theory in 1957. Its core claim is that dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, moves a person to restore consistency, and also to avoid situations and information likely to increase it[6][7]. A cognition, in the theory, is an item of knowledge, whether about one’s own behavior or about the world[8][7].
The word names three different things in Festinger’s writing: the theory, the situation that triggers it and the state it produces. Vaidis and Bran propose separating them as the inconsistency, the dissonance state and the theory, and point out that the state can be reduced in many ways besides attitude change[9]. Dissonance is not the attitude change that sometimes follows, and attitude change alone does not show that dissonance occurred[9].
Festinger’s theory of dissonance and its reduction
Festinger described two cognitions as consonant when they fit together and dissonant when, psychologically, they do not[10]. The magnitude of dissonance grows with the importance of the cognitions involved[9]. In a formulation Festinger and Carlsmith gave in 1959, the total magnitude is a function of the dissonant cognitions divided by the sum of dissonant and consonant cognitions; every consonant cognition added, such as a reward or a threat that explains a behavior, reduces it[10].
Festinger’s own example was a smoker who knows that smoking damages health[7]. He described three ways to reduce dissonance[6][7]:
- The smoker can change the behavior and stop smoking, which Festinger considered the simplest and easiest route when a behavior can be changed.
- The person can change the environment itself, by altering the physical setting or, more commonly, the social one, such as the company kept.
- The smoker can add new consonant cognitions, by seeking out material critical of the evidence on smoking, by comparing smoking with risks judged greater, or by reducing the importance of the conflicting belief.
Figure 1In Festinger’s theory, two cognitions that conflict produce dissonance, an uncomfortable state that motivates its own reduction. He described three routes: changing a behavior, changing a cognition about the environment, and adding new consonant cognitions. After Festinger (1957), using his own smoking example.
Text description
Two boxes at the top hold two cognitions that conflict, Festinger's example being “I smoke” and “Smoking damages health”. Arrows from both lead into a central box labeled dissonance: psychological discomfort that motivates its own reduction, larger when the cognitions matter more and when a greater share of the relevant cognitions conflict. From dissonance, three arrows lead to three routes of reduction: change the behavior, for example stop smoking; change the environment, for example the setting or the company kept; and add consonant cognitions, for example read critiques of the evidence. A note adds that Festinger also described avoiding situations and information likely to increase dissonance.
A statement already made in public cannot be unsaid, so one way to reduce the dissonance it creates is to bring the private opinion into line with it[10]. That prediction underlies the experiments on induced compliance.
Classic examples from the research
Dissonance research has relied on a small set of laboratory paradigms, each built around a different kind of inconsistency[1].
Saying what one does not believe
In Festinger and Carlsmith’s 1959 experiment, 71 male students at Stanford University spent an hour on deliberately tedious tasks: loading spools onto a tray and turning pegs a quarter turn at a time. Each participant was then paid either one dollar or twenty dollars to tell a waiting student, actually a hired confederate, that the tasks had been interesting and enjoyable. A control group told no one anything. Afterward, in what appeared to be an unrelated interview, participants rated how enjoyable the tasks had been on a scale from −5 to +5[10].
After 11 participants were excluded, leaving 20 in each condition, the control group rated the tasks at −0.45 and the twenty-dollar group at −0.05, but the one-dollar group rated them at +1.35[10]. Festinger and Carlsmith reasoned that twenty dollars was ample justification for the lie, whereas one dollar was barely enough, leaving dissonance that the participants reduced by coming to believe what they had said[10]. The result ran against the reinforcement prediction that a larger reward produces more attitude change[11]. Linder, Cooper and Jones later showed that the reversal depends on choice: a small incentive produced more attitude change only when participants felt free to refuse[11].
Choosing between similar options
Brehm proposed in 1956 that choosing between two alternatives creates dissonance, because everything favoring the rejected option conflicts with the choice, and that the dissonance is greatest when the options are nearly equal[8]. In the free-choice paradigm that followed, participants rate a set of items, choose between two they rated similarly, and rate the items again. Studies repeatedly found that the chosen item rises and the rejected item falls in the second rating, an effect called the spreading of alternatives[4]. Whether the effect reflects dissonance at all is now disputed, for the methodological reasons described below.
Suffering to join a group
Aronson and Mills tested under controlled conditions the common observation that people value more highly what they have suffered to obtain, while ruling out the simpler explanation that people who already value a group more are more willing to endure a severe initiation into it[12]. The effort-justification paradigm built on this design: the more unpleasant the behavior people voluntarily undergo to reach a goal, the more they tend to value the goal[1].
Confronting one’s own hypocrisy
In the induced-hypocrisy paradigm, developed from Aronson’s later self-consistency account, people publicly advocate a pro-social behavior and are then reminded of times they failed to practice it themselves; they tend to respond by changing their behavior to make amends[1].
Holding to a failed prophecy
A field study that became canonical in social psychology predates the 1957 book[13]. In When Prophecy Fails (1956), Festinger, Henry Riecken and Stanley Schachter described their covert observation of a small group that expected to be rescued by extraterrestrials from a flood predicted for December 21, 1954[14][13]. They reported that after the prophecy failed, members reaffirmed their beliefs and began to seek converts, and they presented this as confirmation of the theory[13].
That account is now contested. Drawing on newly unsealed archives, Kelly argues that the group, led by Dorothy Martin, had proselytized well before the failure and largely abandoned its beliefs afterward, that the observers influenced events (Riecken posed as a spiritual authority), and that the authors knew their central claims were false[15]. Baggio and Amouroux reply that the archives do not establish intentional misconduct, while accepting that the book may contain errors, distortions or biased interpretations, as earlier critics had also suggested, and that Kelly’s broader thesis may prove correct[13].
Rival accounts and revisions
An early rival account came from Daryl Bem’s self-perception theory in 1967. Bem argued that people infer their attitudes from their own behavior much as an observer would, so the attitude changes in dissonance experiments need no aversive motivational state to explain them[16]. Later experiments addressed the challenge by measuring the state directly. In two induced-compliance experiments, Elliot and Devine used a self-report measure to show that dissonance is experienced as psychological discomfort and that the discomfort is relieved once participants change their attitudes; the second experiment ruled out an explanation based on self-perception[2].
Other revisions changed what dissonance was said to be about[1]:
- Aronson’s self-consistency account held that dissonance arises chiefly when an inconsistency threatens a person’s view of the self[17][1].
- The self-affirmation view held that dissonance reduction serves to restore self-image, and self-affirmation is itself one of the ways people reduce dissonance[1][9].
- Cooper and Fazio’s “new look” held that dissonance follows from feeling personally responsible for an aversive consequence, rather than from inconsistency as such[18][1].
Experiments challenged the new look directly. Participants who drank an unpleasant beverage and freely chose to write that they liked it, then threw the statement away so that no one could be misled, came to like the beverage more than participants given little choice[19]. The action-based model, developed by Eddie Harmon-Jones and colleagues, returns to Festinger’s claim that inconsistency itself is the trigger and adds a reason: dissonance arises specifically when cognitions with implications for action conflict, making it difficult to act, and its function is to resolve the conflict so that behavior can proceed[20][21]. Vaidis and Bran note that the revisions remain compatible with Festinger’s original statement and that most have themselves been questioned[9].
Replication and methodological problems
The free-choice paradigm has a structural flaw. Chen and Risen showed mathematically and experimentally that if ratings measure preferences imperfectly, and choices are partly guided by true preferences, the paradigm will show spreading of alternatives even when no preference has changed[3]. Izuma and Murayama’s simulations confirmed the artifact; in the four studies they found that corrected for it, choice-induced preference change remained but was small (d = 0.26), against d = 0.61 in an earlier meta-analysis of uncorrected studies, and they concluded that the conventional paradigm should no longer be used[4].
The induced-compliance paradigm fared worse in a multilaboratory test. In a replication across 39 laboratories in 19 countries (N = 4,898), writing a counterattitudinal essay under high choice produced no more attitude change than writing it under low choice, the core prediction of the paradigm. Participants who wrote a counterattitudinal essay did shift their attitudes compared with those who wrote a neutral one, and the authors concluded that the paradigm’s evidence for dissonance is in question[5]. Vaidis and Bran trace part of the problem to method: most paradigms manipulate choice or commitment rather than inconsistency itself, and infer dissonance from attitude change instead of measuring the state[9]. The theory keeps its place among the major theories of psychology, but the size and reliability of its classic effects are less certain than its history suggests[9][5].
Sources21
Numbered in order of first citation.
- 1.Cancino-Montecinos, S., Björklund, F., & Lindholm, T. (2020). A general model of dissonance reduction: Unifying past accounts via an emotion regulation perspective. Frontiers in Psychology, 11. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.540081
- 2.Elliot, A. J., & Devine, P. G. (1994). On the motivational nature of cognitive dissonance: Dissonance as psychological discomfort. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(3), 382–394. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.3.382
- 3.Chen, M. K., & Risen, J. L. (2010). How choice affects and reflects preferences: Revisiting the free-choice paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99(4), 573–594. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020217
- 4.Izuma, K., & Murayama, K. (2013). Choice-induced preference change in the free-choice paradigm: A critical methodological review. Frontiers in Psychology, 4. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00041
- 5.Vaidis, D. C., Sleegers, W. W. A., van Leeuwen, F., DeMarree, K. G., Sætrevik, B., Ross, R. M., Schmidt, K., Protzko, J., Morvinski, C., Ghasemi, O., Roberts, A. J., Stone, J., Bran, A., Gourdon-Kanhukamwe, A., Gunsoy, C., Moussaoui, L. S., Smith, A. R., Nugier, A., Fayant, M.-P., … Priolo, D. (2024). A multilab replication of the induced-compliance paradigm of cognitive dissonance. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 7(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/25152459231213375
- 6.Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Row, Peterson.
- 7.Kaaronen, R. O. (2018). A theory of predictive dissonance: Predictive processing presents a new take on cognitive dissonance. Frontiers in Psychology, 9. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02218
- 8.Brehm, J. W. (1956). Postdecision changes in the desirability of alternatives. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52(3), 384–389. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0041006
- 9.Vaidis, D. C., & Bran, A. (2019). Respectable challenges to respectable theory: Cognitive dissonance theory requires conceptualization clarification and operational tools. Frontiers in Psychology, 10. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01189
- 10.Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58(2), 203–210. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0041593
- 11.Linder, D. E., Cooper, J., & Jones, E. E. (1967). Decision freedom as a determinant of the role of incentive magnitude in attitude change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6(3), 245–254. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0021220
- 12.Aronson, E., & Mills, J. (1959). The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59(2), 177–181. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0047195
- 13.Baggio, S., & Amouroux, R. (2026). When criticism fails: An answer to Kelly (2026) on debunking When Prophecy Fails. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 62(4). https://doi.org/10.1002/jhbs.70076
- 14.Festinger, L., Riecken, H. W., & Schachter, S. (1956). When prophecy fails. University of Minnesota Press.
- 15.Kelly, T. (2026). Debunking “When Prophecy Fails”. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 62(1). https://doi.org/10.1002/jhbs.70043
- 16.Bem, D. J. (1967). Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. Psychological Review, 74(3), 183–200. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0024835
- 17.Aronson, E. (1969). The theory of cognitive dissonance: A current perspective. In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (pp. 1–34). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60075-1
- 18.Cooper, J., & Fazio, R. H. (1984). A new look at dissonance theory. In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (pp. 229–266). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60121-5
- 19.Harmon-Jones, E., Brehm, J. W., Greenberg, J., Simon, L., & Nelson, D. E. (1996). Evidence that the production of aversive consequences is not necessary to create cognitive dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(1), 5–16. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.1.5
- 20.Harmon-Jones, E., Harmon-Jones, C., & Levy, N. (2015). An action-based model of cognitive-dissonance processes. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24(3), 184–189. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721414566449
- 21.Harmon-Jones, E., & Harmon-Jones, C. (2007). Cognitive dissonance theory after 50 years of development. Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 38(1), 7–16. https://doi.org/10.1024/0044-3514.38.1.7
Further reading
- Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Row, Peterson.Reissued by Stanford University Press in 1962.
- Harmon-Jones, E., & Harmon-Jones, C. (2007). Cognitive dissonance theory after 50 years of development. Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 38(1), 7–16. https://doi.org/10.1024/0044-3514.38.1.7
- Vaidis, D. C., & Bran, A. (2019). Respectable challenges to respectable theory: Cognitive dissonance theory requires conceptualization clarification and operational tools. Frontiers in Psychology, 10. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01189
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Cite this entry
APA 7
Psych Dictionary. (2026, October 18). Cognitive dissonance. In Psych Dictionary. https://www.psychdictionary.com/concepts/cognitive-dissonance
MLA 9
“Cognitive Dissonance.” Psych Dictionary, 18 Oct. 2026, www.psychdictionary.com/concepts/cognitive-dissonance.