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Psych Dictionary

Theory of mind

  • Concept · Developmental and social cognitive psychology
  • Mixed or contested
  • Published October 19, 2026
  • 19 sources
  • 5 min read

In short

Theory of mind is the capacity to attribute mental states such as intentions, knowledge and beliefs to oneself and to others, and to use them to explain and predict behavior. Understanding that another person can hold a false belief is the standard developmental test.

Key facts

Field
Developmental and social cognitive psychology
Originators
David Premack and Guy Woodruff (1978); Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner (1983)
First described
1978
Also known as
ToM; Mentalizing; Mindreading

State of the evidence

Mixed or contested

A meta-analysis of 178 studies found a consistent shift from below-chance to above-chance false-belief performance during the preschool years[1], with parallel trajectories but different timing in China and North America[2]. Claims beyond that are contested: evidence of false-belief understanding in infants and in great apes rests on anticipatory-looking measures with documented replication problems[3][4], and the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind is disputed[5]. The construct itself is defined and measured inconsistently across fields[6].

Evidence labels summarise the research literature; they are not recommendations. How labels are assigned

Theory of mind is the capacity to attribute mental states, such as purposes, intentions, knowledge and beliefs, to oneself and to others, and to use those attributions to explain and predict behavior. In the 1978 paper that asked whether chimpanzees have a theory of mind, David Premack and Guy Woodruff called such a system of inferences a theory because the states it posits cannot be observed directly and because it can be used to make predictions about what others will do[7].

The term overlaps with others. Some writers use mentalizing instead; the revised “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test, for example, was presented as a measure of adult mentalizing[8]. A review of the construct found that usage of the term had spread from developmental psychology to social neuroscience and psychiatry, and that its meaning had become vague and inconsistent along the way[6]. In developmental research the standard test is narrower: whether a child understands that someone else can hold a belief that does not match reality[1].

Origins in primate research

The question was first asked of chimpanzees. Premack and Woodruff showed an adult chimpanzee videotapes of a human actor struggling with problems, such as bananas out of reach or a phonograph that would not play because it was unplugged, and offered photographs of possible solutions. The animal’s consistent choice of the correct photograph was interpreted as recognizing the actor’s purpose[7].

Thirty years later, a review concluded that chimpanzees understand others’ goals and intentions and what others perceive and know, but that there was no evidence that they understand false beliefs: in the reviewers’ terms, a perception–goal psychology rather than a full belief–desire psychology[9]. In 2016, an anticipatory-looking study reported that three species of great apes looked to where an agent falsely believed an object to be, which its authors took as implicit understanding of false belief[10]. Critics replied that such reports should be interpreted cautiously, because anticipatory-looking measures have faced extensive replication problems in research with humans[3].

False belief as the developmental test

Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner studied young children’s understanding of other people’s wrong beliefs and of deception[11], and false-belief tasks of this kind came to be treated as a definitive test of mental-state understanding[1]. A meta-analysis of 178 studies found that older preschoolers consistently passed false-belief tasks while younger children systematically erred, and that performance moved from below chance to above chance during the preschool years across countries and task variations. Age, country of origin and four task factors together accounted for 55% of the variance in performance. The authors read the pattern as genuine conceptual change, not an artifact of difficult tasks[1].

The timing differs between communities even where the sequence does not. A meta-analysis of more than 3,000 children in mainland China and Hong Kong, compared with children in the United States and Canada, found parallel developmental trajectories but differences in timing of as much as two years or more between locales[2].

Infant studies and two-system accounts

Nonverbal methods appeared to move the capacity much earlier. In a nonverbal task, 15-month-old infants predicted an actor’s behavior from her true or false belief about where a toy was hidden, and the authors concluded that children appeal to mental states from a young age[12]. The result produced a puzzle: children fail verbal false-belief tests before 3 to 4 years of age, yet infants apparently pass nonverbal versions at 13 to 15 months[13].

One proposed resolution holds that humans have two systems. A cognitively efficient but inflexible capacity tracks belief-like states and could explain the success of infants and nonhuman animals on some tasks; a later-developing, flexible but demanding capacity supports full belief reasoning, which remains effortful even for adults[13]. The infant evidence has also weakened on its own terms. Replication attempts with anticipatory-looking measures across the life span were published in 2018, one of them reporting a non-replication[14][4], and these measures are now treated with caution in both the infant and the primate literature[3].

Measurement in adults and the brain

Measures for adults aim at subtler individual differences. The revised Eyes Test was built to detect them; in its validation it distinguished 15 adults with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism from 239 controls and correlated inversely with a measure of autistic traits, the Autism Spectrum Quotient[8]. A later psychometric analysis found that little was known about the test’s factor structure, internal consistency and convergent validity, proposed a shorter form with adequate internal consistency, and reported that scores were moderately related to cognitive empathy and emotion perception but strongly related to vocabulary[15].

Neuroimaging studies localize part of the capacity. A region of the temporo-parietal junction responded when people read stories about a character’s mental states, but not when stories described people in physical detail or described false representations without a social element, which its authors took as specificity for reasoning about the contents of another mind[16]. The same review that criticized the term’s vagueness argued that the original definition does not translate easily into the basic processes that neuroscience studies, which leaves the interpretation of imaging results unclear[6].

Autism and the deficit claim

In 1985, Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan Leslie and Uta Frith asked whether autistic children have a theory of mind[17]. The claim that autistic people lack one went on to pervade psychology[5]. It is now contested. A 2019 review argued that the evidence fails to show that autistic people are uniquely or universally impaired on theory-of-mind tasks, that some original findings have not replicated, and that the various tasks often fail to relate to one another or to autistic traits, social interaction and empathy; it concluded that the claim is empirically questionable and harmful[5]. The “double empathy problem”, proposed by an autistic researcher, criticizes the definition of autism as a theory-of-mind deficit and reframes the difficulties as a matter of reciprocity and mutuality between people[18].

The disagreement covers both the evidence and its interpretation: whether autistic people differ on these tasks as consistently as the deficit claim requires[5], and whether differences that do appear reflect a capacity missing in one person or a problem of reciprocity between people[18].

Theory of mind in clinical research

Difficulties on theory-of-mind tasks are not specific to autism. A systematic review of 31 meta-analyses across 30 psychiatric, neurological and developmental conditions found that people in many clinical groups performed worse than healthy controls on facial emotion recognition or theory-of-mind tasks, with deficits broadly similar in size to those reported for memory and executive function. Its authors noted that the real-world impact of these differences remains to be clarified[19]. Within psychotherapy, the related capacity of mentalizing is the focus of mentalization-based therapy, which has its own entry.

Sources19

Numbered in order of first citation.

  1. 1.Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655–684. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00304
  2. 2.Liu, D., Wellman, H. M., Tardif, T., & Sabbagh, M. A. (2008). Theory of mind development in Chinese children: A meta-analysis of false-belief understanding across cultures and languages. Developmental Psychology, 44(2), 523–531. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.44.2.523
  3. 3.Horschler, D. J., MacLean, E. L., & Santos, L. R. (2020). Do non-human primates really represent others’ beliefs?. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 24(8), 594–605. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.05.009
  4. 4.Burnside, K., Ruel, A., Azar, N., & Poulin-Dubois, D. (2018). Implicit false belief across the lifespan: Non-replication of an anticipatory looking task. Cognitive Development, 46, 4–11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.08.006
  5. 5.Gernsbacher, M. A., & Yergeau, M. (2019). Empirical failures of the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind. Archives of Scientific Psychology, 7(1), 102–118. https://doi.org/10.1037/arc0000067
  6. 6.Schaafsma, S. M., Pfaff, D. W., Spunt, R. P., & Adolphs, R. (2015). Deconstructing and reconstructing theory of mind. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(2), 65–72. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2014.11.007
  7. 7.Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), 515–526. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076512
  8. 8.Baron‐Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., & Plumb, I. (2001). The “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test revised version: A study with normal adults, and adults with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42(2), 241–251. https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-7610.00715
  9. 9.Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(5), 187–192. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010
  10. 10.Krupenye, C., Kano, F., Hirata, S., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2016). Great apes anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs. Science, 354(6308), 110–114. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf8110
  11. 11.Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13(1), 103–128. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5
  12. 12.Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs?. Science, 308(5719), 255–258. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1107621
  13. 13.Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?. Psychological Review, 116(4), 953–970. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016923
  14. 14.Kulke, L., Reiß, M., Krist, H., & Rakoczy, H. (2018). How robust are anticipatory looking measures of theory of mind? Replication attempts across the life span. Cognitive Development, 46, 97–111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.09.001
  15. 15.Olderbak, S., Wilhelm, O., Olaru, G., Geiger, M., Brenneman, M. W., & Roberts, R. D. (2015). A psychometric analysis of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test: Toward a brief form for research and applied settings. Frontiers in Psychology, 6. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01503
  16. 16.Saxe, R., & Kanwisher, N. (2003). People thinking about thinking people: The role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind”. NeuroImage, 19(4), 1835–1842. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00230-1
  17. 17.Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”?. Cognition, 21(1), 37–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8
  18. 18.Milton, D. E. (2012). On the ontological status of autism: The ‘double empathy problem’. Disability & Society, 27(6), 883–887. https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2012.710008
  19. 19.Cotter, J., Granger, K., Backx, R., Hobbs, M., Looi, C. Y., & Barnett, J. H. (2018). Social cognitive dysfunction as a clinical marker: A systematic review of meta-analyses across 30 clinical conditions. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 84, 92–99. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.11.014

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Written by Editorial team. First published October 19, 2026. Editorial standards

Educational reference material. Nothing on this site is a diagnosis, a treatment recommendation or a substitute for care from a qualified clinician.