Object permanence
- Concept · Developmental psychology
- Mixed or contested
- Published November 15, 2026
- 21 sources
- 5 min read
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Key facts
- Field
- Developmental psychology
- Originators
- Jean Piaget
- First described
- 1954 (English edition of Piaget’s account)
- Also known as
- Object concept; Object permanency; Permanence of the object
- Topics
- Developmental psychology
State of the evidence
Mixed or contestedThe search behavior Piaget described is well replicated: a meta-analysis of the A-not-B error found that age, the delay before search, the number of hiding locations and the number of trials at the first location predict performance[1]. What the behavior shows is contested. Violation-of-expectation studies report expectations about hidden objects at 3½ to 5 months[2][3], but one drawbridge result was reproduced with no hidden object and attributed to a preference for more motion[4], and search errors have been explained by memory, action and social processes rather than by a missing concept[5][6][7].
Evidence labels summarise the research literature; they are not recommendations. How labels are assigned
Object permanence is the understanding that an object goes on existing when it is no longer seen, heard or touched[8]. Jean Piaget made it one of the achievements of the sensorimotor period, the first stage of his theory of cognitive development, and inferred it from what infants do when a toy is hidden[9]. In his account the understanding is built gradually over the first two years. Later research that measured looking rather than reaching suggests that some knowledge of hidden objects is present months earlier, and whether looking or reaching is the better index of what an infant knows remains disputed[8][10].
Object permanence concerns physical objects and is a cognitive achievement. Libidinal object constancy, the end point of the separation–individuation sequence described by Margaret Mahler, is a different and psychoanalytic concept[11][12].
Piaget’s stages of the object concept
Piaget described the object concept as developing in six stages that run alongside the six substages of sensorimotor intelligence, from observations of infants searching for objects that had been covered or moved[9]. In the first two stages an infant does not search for an object that disappears. In the third the infant retrieves an object that is only partly covered and follows a moving object with the eyes, but makes no search for one that is fully hidden. Search for a completely covered object marks the fourth stage, at about 8 months, although infants at this stage still search where the object was found before rather than where they saw it hidden[9][8].
In the fifth stage, at about 12 months, infants search where they last saw the object go. In the sixth, at about 18 months, they follow invisible displacements: an infant who saw an object hidden under the outermost of several covers removes the covers in turn to find it[8]. Piaget took this last stage as the point at which the infant can represent an absent object[9]. His terms for how such structures change, assimilation and accommodation, are described under cognitive schema.
The A-not-B error
In the standard task an object is hidden at one location, A, and the infant retrieves it there over several trials. The object is then hidden at a second location, B, in full view, and the infant reaches back to A[13]. Piaget read this perseverative search as evidence of a limited and fragile understanding that the object exists[10].
The error is among the most robust and most studied findings in developmental psychology[6]. In a study that tested 25 infants every two weeks from the age at which they first reached for a hidden object until 12 months, the delay between hiding and search needed to produce the error rose by about 2 seconds a month, from under 2 seconds at 7½ months to over 10 seconds by 12 months. Errors disappeared when the delay was cut by 2 to 3 seconds[5]. A logistic meta-analysis of 107 data points found that age, the delay, the number of hiding locations and the number of trials at A predicted performance[1]. Adele Diamond read the task as an index of the ability to act on stored information against a conflicting habitual tendency[5], a reading that ties the error to memory and inhibition rather than to the concept of the object.
Violation-of-expectation studies
From the 1980s Renée Baillargeon and colleagues measured looking instead of reaching. In the drawbridge studies, infants were habituated to a screen rotating through 180 degrees. A box was then placed behind the screen, and infants looked longer when it appeared to rotate through the space the box occupied than when it rotated only 112 degrees and appeared to stop at the box[4]. Designs of this kind treat longer looking at an implausible or impossible event as an index of what the infant expected[14]. Longer looking at the impossible event was taken as evidence that infants represented the hidden box, first at 5 months and then at 3½ months[2][3][10].
Elizabeth Spelke and colleagues proposed from such experiments that early physical reasoning follows two constraints of mature physical conceptions, continuity and solidity, but not gravity and inertia, and that knowledge is enriched around an unchanging core rather than built from perceptual or motor experience[15]. Baillargeon’s later account of infants’ physical reasoning integrates findings on occlusion, containment and covering events, and distinguishes event-general from event-specific expectations[16]. The method has since spread well beyond hidden objects: a 2024 overview describes more than 35 years of its use to study physical, psychological, sociomoral, numerical and linguistic expectations in the first three years[17].
Critiques of looking-time evidence
Critics argued that longer looking need not mean surprise at a violated principle. When Rivera, Wakeley and Langer removed the box, infants still looked longer at 180-degree rotations, with no difference in effect size, and the authors attributed the drawbridge result to a perceptual preference for more motion[4]. Bogartz, Shinskey and Speaker argued that the standard design confounds an event’s possibility with its novelty or familiarity, proposed factorial designs that vary the two independently, and favored perceptual processing over inference and belief as the explanation of infant looking[18]. Marshall Haith asked whether such “rich interpretation” is too costly[19]. Jackson and Sirois added pupil dilation to a factorial design as a second measure and concluded that it can help interpret otherwise equivocal looking times[14]. Bremner, Slater and Johnson proposed a perceptual model in which young infants perceive that an object persists behind an occluder only when several cues combine, and argued that these perceptual developments in the first six months probably underpin the later cognitive principle[20].
Baillargeon’s 2004 review presented findings meant to answer concerns about the method[16], and the 2024 overview set out its strengths and limitations alongside the challenges raised against it[17]. The dispute is therefore not over whether the looking effects occur, but over whether they show a concept of the object, a perceptual expectation or a response to novelty.
Process accounts of looking and reaching
Infants look as though they expect hidden objects to persist months before they search for them. Munakata, McClelland, Johnson and Siegler tested one explanation of the gap, that infants younger than 8 months know that objects persist but lack the means–end skills to retrieve them. Seven-month-olds trained on the same means–end behaviors still retrieved visible toys more often than occluded ones. The authors proposed instead that knowledge is graded and embedded in particular behaviors, and showed in simulations that representations of occluded objects learned gradually could account for both the successes and the failures[21].
Esther Thelen, Linda Smith and colleagues explained the A-not-B error without an object concept. In their dynamic field account the reach back to A arises from the coupled processes of looking, planning, reaching and remembering: a body-centered spatial code, the memory of earlier reaches and the close link between looking and reaching[6][13]. Topál and colleagues argued that the error also reflects how infants interpret the hiding game as a communicative demonstration. When the experimenter hid the object without the usual communicative cues, the proportion of 10-month-olds who made the error fell from 81 to 41 percent[7]. In a later study, infants searched more accurately when the experimenter looked toward location B, and their looking at the experimenter suggested that they expected the object where they searched[10].
The adaptive-process and dynamic accounts share a claim that separates them from Piaget’s: knowledge of objects is not distinct from the behavior used to measure it, so a failure on one task and a success on another need not mean that the infant both lacks and has the concept[21][6].
Sources21
Numbered in order of first citation.
- 1.Marcovitch, S., & Zelazo, P. D. (1999). The A-not-B error: Results from a logistic meta-analysis. Child Development, 70(6), 1297–1313. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00095
- 2.Baillargeon, R., Spelke, E. S., & Wasserman, S. (1985). Object permanence in five-month-old infants. Cognition, 20(3), 191–208. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(85)90008-3
- 3.Baillargeon, R. (1987). Object permanence in 3½- and 4½-month-old infants. Developmental Psychology, 23(5), 655–664. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.23.5.655
- 4.Rivera, S. M., Wakeley, A., & Langer, J. (1999). The drawbridge phenomenon: Representational reasoning or perceptual preference?. Developmental Psychology, 35(2), 427–435. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.35.2.427
- 5.Diamond, A. (1985). Development of the ability to use recall to guide action, as indicated by infants’ performance on AB. Child Development, 56(4), 868–883. https://doi.org/10.2307/1130099
- 6.Smith, L. B., Thelen, E., Titzer, R., & McLin, D. (1999). Knowing in the context of acting: The task dynamics of the A-not-B error. Psychological Review, 106(2), 235–260. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.106.2.235
- 7.Topál, J., Gergely, G., Miklósi, A., Erdohegyi, A., & Csibra, G. (2008). Infants’ perseverative search errors are induced by pragmatic misinterpretation. Science, 321(5897), 1831–1834. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1161437
- 8.American Psychological Association (2018). Object permanence. APA Dictionary of Psychology. dictionary.apa.org/object-permanence
- 9.Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. Basic Books.
- 10.Dunn, K., & Bremner, J. G. (2020). Investigating the social environment of the A‐not‐B search task. Developmental Science, 23(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.12921
- 11.Skorczewski, D., & Bergman, A. (2005). Getting Attica out of her mind: A psychoanalytic memoir. American Imago, 62(3), 315–338. https://doi.org/10.1353/aim.2005.0036
- 12.Gergely, G. (2000). Reapproaching Mahler: New perspectives on normal autism, symbiosis, splitting and libidinal object constancy from cognitive developmental theory. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 48(4), 1197–1228. https://doi.org/10.1177/00030651000480040801
- 13.Thelen, E., Schöner, G., Scheier, C., & Smith, L. B. (2001). The dynamics of embodiment: A field theory of infant perseverative reaching. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(1), 1–34. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X01003910
- 14.Jackson, I., & Sirois, S. (2009). Infant cognition: going full factorial with pupil dilation. Developmental Science, 12(4), 670–679. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00805.x
- 15.Spelke, E. S., Breinlinger, K., Macomber, J., & Jacobson, K. (1992). Origins of knowledge. Psychological Review, 99(4), 605–632. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.99.4.605
- 16.Baillargeon, R. (2004). Infants’ reasoning about hidden objects: evidence for event‐general and event‐specific expectations. Developmental Science, 7(4), 391–414. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00357.x
- 17.Margoni, F., Surian, L., & Baillargeon, R. (2024). The violation-of-expectation paradigm: A conceptual overview. Psychological Review, 131(3), 716–748. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000450
- 18.Bogartz, R. S., Shinskey, J. L., & Speaker, C. J. (1997). Interpreting infant looking: The event set × event set design. Developmental Psychology, 33(3), 408–422. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.33.3.408
- 19.Haith, M. M. (1998). Who put the cog in infant cognition? Is rich interpretation too costly?. Infant Behavior and Development, 21(2), 167–179. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0163-6383(98)90001-7
- 20.Bremner, J. G., Slater, A. M., & Johnson, S. P. (2015). Perception of object persistence: The origins of object permanence in infancy. Child Development Perspectives, 9(1), 7–13. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12098
- 21.Munakata, Y., McClelland, J. L., Johnson, M. H., & Siegler, R. S. (1997). Rethinking infant knowledge: Toward an adaptive process account of successes and failures in object permanence tasks. Psychological Review, 104(4), 686–713. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.104.4.686
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Cite this entry
APA 7
Psych Dictionary. (2026, November 15). Object permanence. In Psych Dictionary. https://www.psychdictionary.com/concepts/object-permanence
MLA 9
“Object Permanence.” Psych Dictionary, 15 Nov. 2026, www.psychdictionary.com/concepts/object-permanence.