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Psych Dictionary

Empathy vs sympathy

  • Comparison
  • Published October 19, 2026
  • 16 sources
  • 6 min read

In short

Empathy is the sharing or understanding of another person’s emotional state with the knowledge that it is the other person’s; sympathy is concern for someone in a negative state together with a motivation to relieve it. Research often puts the difference as “feeling with” against “feeling for”.

Key facts

Compares
Empathy

Definition

Empathy
Sharing or understanding another person’s emotional state while recognizing that it belongs to the other person
Sympathy
Heightened sensitivity to another person’s negative emotional state, with a motivation to relieve it, without necessarily sharing the feeling

Short formula

Empathy
“Feeling with”
Sympathy
“Feeling for”

States responded to

Empathy
Positive and negative states, such as another person’s joy or pain
Sympathy
The other person’s negative state, such as distress or suffering

Components

Empathy
A cognitive component (recognizing thoughts and feelings, perspective taking) and an affective component (shared feeling)
Sympathy
An affective, other-oriented response, often treated as one component of empathy

Usual research measure

Empathy
Several measures, including the perspective-taking and personal-distress subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index and tests of empathic accuracy
Sympathy
Empathic concern, measured by an Interpersonal Reactivity Index subscale or by ratings of feeling sympathetic, moved or compassionate

Motivation

Empathy
Depends on the form; self-focused personal distress has been linked to an egoistic motive to reduce one’s own arousal
Sympathy
Other-directed; the motive is to reduce the other person’s need

Origin of the word

Empathy
Coined by Edward Titchener as a translation of the German Einfühlung
Sympathy
An older term, which Theodor Lipps regarded as close to Einfühlung

Place in psychotherapy

Empathy
One of Carl Rogers’s conditions of therapeutic change; therapist empathy correlates with outcome at r = .28 across 82 samples
Sympathy
Not among Rogers’s conditions

Empathy and sympathy are two responses to another person’s emotional state. Empathy is the sharing or understanding of that state with the knowledge that it belongs to the other person; sympathy is concern for a person in a negative state, joined to a motivation to relieve it, without necessarily sharing the feeling[1][2]. Researchers often summarize the difference as “feeling with” against “feeling for”[2].

The two terms overlap in research use. Sympathy, the other-oriented response, is often measured and reported as empathic concern, and the two labels are frequently used interchangeably[3][4].

Feeling with and feeling for

Singer and Klimecki define empathy as the capacity to share the feelings of others, positive as well as negative. In empathy a person feels with someone without confusing self and other: the observer knows that the emotion being shared is the other person’s. Without that self–other distinction the response is emotion contagion, which they describe as a precursor of empathy already present in babies[1]. Psychotherapy research uses a plainer definition: Elliott and colleagues describe empathy as understanding what another person is experiencing or trying to express[5].

Sympathy, on the account that Michalec and Hafferty describe as a consensus among contemporary scholars, does not involve feeling the same or a similar feeling as the other person. It is a heightened sensitivity to the other person’s negative emotional state, accompanied by a motivation to relieve that state through help, comfort or support[2]. Two differences follow from the definitions. Empathy can be felt for positive states, such as another person’s joy[1], whereas sympathy responds to a negative one. Sympathy also includes a motivation to help by definition, while the motivational consequences of shared feeling depend on the form it takes, as research on personal distress shows.

Origins of the two terms

Sympathy is the older word. Robert Vischer introduced the concept of Einfühlung in nineteenth-century German debates on aesthetics, in relation to art, and Theodor Lipps extended it to visual illusions and to the understanding of other people. Lipps regarded Einfühlung as basically similar to the old notion of sympathy. Edward Titchener, in America, believed it had a different meaning and coined empathy as its translation, a term adopted first in psychology and then more generally[6].

Lauren Wispé’s 1986 article, “The distinction between sympathy and empathy”, is a common reference point for the later research usage[7]. Subsequent papers cite it for treating empathic concern as synonymous with sympathy[4], and for treating empathy as the broader, multifaceted concept of which empathic concern is one aspect[3].

Cognitive and affective components of empathy

Researchers in social psychology and social neuroscience broadly agree that empathy involves both cognitive and affective processes, although whether empathy is primarily emotional, primarily cognitive or a combination of the two is still debated[2]. The cognitive component is the accurate recognition of another person’s thoughts and feelings[4]. Singer and Klimecki separate the capacity to infer other people’s beliefs, intentions and thoughts, called mentalizing, theory of mind or cognitive perspective taking, from empathy in the sense of shared feeling[1].

Davis’s Interpersonal Reactivity Index made the components measurable. Its four subscales assess perspective taking, fantasy, empathic concern and personal distress. In a validation study with 1,344 undergraduates, the subscales related to other measures in different ways: perspective taking went with better social functioning and higher self-esteem, empathic concern with shyness and anxiety and with lower egotism, and personal distress, in the study’s strongest relationships, with low self-esteem, poor interpersonal functioning, vulnerability and fearfulness[8]. In this framework sympathy, measured as empathic concern, is one part of empathy rather than its alternative[3].

Empathic concern and personal distress

Seeing another person in need can produce two different emotional responses. Batson, Fultz and Schoenrade reviewed evidence for feelings of personal distress, described with words such as alarmed, upset, worried and troubled, and for other-focused feelings described as sympathetic, moved, compassionate, tender, warm and softhearted[9]. In their review the two had different motivational consequences. Personal distress appeared to evoke an egoistic motivation to reduce one’s own aversive arousal; the other-focused feeling did not, and the motivation it evoked appeared directed at reducing the other person’s need[9]. Batson’s label for the second response was empathy[9]; empathic concern and sympathy are the labels most commonly used for it in the wider literature[3].

The difference appears in when people help. Hortensius and colleagues summarize earlier studies in which helping driven by personal distress fell when the aversive situation could easily be avoided, while helping driven by sympathy did not[3]. Personal distress is conceptualized as the self-focused response and empathic concern, or sympathy, as the other-focused one[4].

Compassion as a third term

Compassion is defined in terms close to sympathy but studied as an emotion in its own right. A review by Goetz, Keltner and Simon-Thomas found compassion to have distinct appraisals attuned to undeserved suffering, distinct signaling behavior related to caregiving through touch, posture and vocalization, and an experience and physiological response that orient the person toward social approach. That profile differed from those of distress, sadness and love, and the authors concluded that compassion is a distinct emotion[10].

A later review of definitions proposed five elements of compassion: recognizing suffering, understanding the universality of human suffering, feeling for the person who suffers, tolerating the uncomfortable feelings involved, and being motivated to act to relieve the suffering[11]. The third and fifth elements correspond to the definition of sympathy given above; the second and fourth have no counterpart in it. The same review noted a lack of consensus on the definition, and the nine measures it rated scored between 2 and 7 out of 14 for quality[11].

Compassion has also been set against empathic distress experimentally. In a training study, participants trained first in empathic resonance reported more negative affect when watching videos of human suffering, with increased activation in brain regions previously associated with empathy for pain. Subsequent compassion training reversed the increase in negative affect, increased positive affect and engaged a separate brain network, and the authors proposed compassion as a way of coping with empathic distress[12]. It is a single training study and did not measure sympathy separately.

Empathy, sympathy and related responsesTwo parts. Sharing another’s feeling: emotion contagion, shared feeling without the self–other distinction and present in babies, leads by an arrow labeled a precursor to empathy, feeling with someone while knowing the feeling is theirs. Under empathy, two components: cognitive, accurate recognition of another person’s thoughts and feelings, and affective, sharing the other person’s feeling. Responses to another person in need, in two columns: self-focused personal distress, described as alarmed, upset or worried, with a motivation to reduce one’s own aversive arousal; and other-focused empathic concern, or sympathy, described as moved, compassionate or tender, with a motivation directed at the other person’s need. Below sympathy, linked by a dashed line, compassion: defined close to sympathy but studied as a distinct emotion, and proposed as a way of coping with empathic distress. A note says that Batson’s own label for the other-focused response was empathy, and that Singer and Klimecki treat mentalizing, the capacity to infer others’ thoughts, as separate from empathy as shared feeling.SHARING ANOTHER’S FEELINGEmotion contagionShared feeling without the self–otherdistinction; present in babiesa precursorEmpathyFeeling with someone, knowing the feeling istheirsCognitiveAccurate recognitionof another person’sthoughts and feelingsAffectiveSharing the otherperson’s feelingRESPONSES TO ANOTHER PERSON IN NEEDSELF-FOCUSEDPersonal distressAlarmed, upset,worried; a motivationto reduce one’s ownaversive arousalOTHER-FOCUSEDEmpathic concern,or sympathyMoved, compassionate,tender; a motivationdirected at the otherperson’s needCompassionDefined close tosympathy but studiedas a distinct emotion;proposed as a way ofcoping with empathicdistressBatson’s own label for the other-focusedresponse was empathy. Singer and Klimecki treatthe capacity to infer others’ thoughts,mentalizing, as separate from empathy as sharedfeeling.

Figure 1Emotion contagion is a precursor of empathy, which keeps the distinction between self and other and has cognitive and affective components. Seeing someone in need can produce self-focused personal distress or other-focused empathic concern, also called sympathy; compassion is defined close to sympathy but studied as a distinct emotion. After Singer and Klimecki (2014), Batson, Fultz and Schoenrade (1987), Atkins and colleagues (2016), Goetz and colleagues (2010) and Klimecki and colleagues (2014).

Text description

Two parts. Sharing another’s feeling: emotion contagion, shared feeling without the self–other distinction and present in babies, leads by an arrow labeled a precursor to empathy, feeling with someone while knowing the feeling is theirs. Under empathy, two components: cognitive, accurate recognition of another person’s thoughts and feelings, and affective, sharing the other person’s feeling. Responses to another person in need, in two columns: self-focused personal distress, described as alarmed, upset or worried, with a motivation to reduce one’s own aversive arousal; and other-focused empathic concern, or sympathy, described as moved, compassionate or tender, with a motivation directed at the other person’s need. Below sympathy, linked by a dashed line, compassion: defined close to sympathy but studied as a distinct emotion, and proposed as a way of coping with empathic distress. A note says that Batson’s own label for the other-focused response was empathy, and that Singer and Klimecki treat mentalizing, the capacity to infer others’ thoughts, as separate from empathy as shared feeling.

Directed at oneself, compassion becomes self-compassion, which Kristin Neff defined by three components: self-kindness, common humanity and mindfulness[13]. Therapeutic uses of compassion are described under compassion-focused therapy.

Empathy as a condition of psychotherapy

Carl Rogers made empathy one of his conditions of therapeutic change. Among the six conditions he proposed, which had to hold together over a period of time, are that the therapist experiences an empathic understanding of the client’s internal frame of reference and that the client perceives it, at least to a minimal degree[14][15]. Sympathy is not among the conditions. The full set, and Rogers’s claim that the conditions are sufficient as well as necessary, are described under person-centered therapy.

Therapist empathy has since been studied across orientations. A 2018 meta-analysis found that it correlated with client outcome at r = .28 (equivalent to d = .58) across 82 samples and 6,138 clients. The association held across theoretical orientations and presenting problems, but effects varied considerably between studies, and clients’, observers’ and therapists’ perceptions of empathy predicted outcome better than measures of empathic accuracy[5].

The association is correlational, and a correlation of this kind does not establish that empathy causes improvement. The same question has been set out for the therapeutic alliance, where a correlation with outcome has been read as showing that the relationship is therapeutic in itself, that it is a by-product of improvement, or that it allows other ingredients of treatment to work[16].

Inconsistent usage across fields

The distinction is not stable across literatures. Hortensius and colleagues note that the label empathic concern can suggest, misleadingly, that empathic concern and empathy are the same thing[3]. In medicine the assignment of the two terms has sometimes been reversed. Michalec and Hafferty describe Hojat and colleagues’ model of physician empathy as defining empathy as a mainly cognitive understanding of the patient and assigning “feeling with” the patient to sympathy; they argue that this emotion-deficient version departs from the broader concept of empathy in social psychology and neuroscience[2].

Jahoda draws a historical conclusion from the same disagreement. Lipps had treated Einfühlung as close to sympathy, and the continuing lack of agreement about how the two concepts differ suggested to Jahoda that Lipps had probably been right[6].

Sources16

Numbered in order of first citation.

  1. 1.Singer, T., & Klimecki, O. M. (2014). Empathy and compassion. Current Biology, 24(18), R875–R878. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2014.06.054
  2. 2.Michalec, B., & Hafferty, F. W. (2022). Challenging the clinically-situated emotion-deficient version of empathy within medicine and medical education research. Social Theory & Health, 20(3), 306–324. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41285-021-00174-0
  3. 3.Hortensius, R., Schutter, D. J., & de Gelder, B. (2016). Personal distress and the influence of bystanders on responding to an emergency. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 16(4), 672–688. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-016-0423-6
  4. 4.Atkins, D., Uskul, A. K., & Cooper, N. R. (2016). Culture shapes empathic responses to physical and social pain. Emotion, 16(5), 587–601. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000162
  5. 5.Elliott, R., Bohart, A. C., Watson, J. C., & Murphy, D. (2018). Therapist empathy and client outcome: An updated meta-analysis. Psychotherapy, 55(4), 399–410. https://doi.org/10.1037/pst0000175
  6. 6.Jahoda, G. (2005). Theodor Lipps and the shift from “sympathy” to “empathy”. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 41(2), 151–163. https://doi.org/10.1002/jhbs.20080
  7. 7.Wispé, L. (1986). The distinction between sympathy and empathy: To call forth a concept, a word is needed. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50(2), 314–321. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.50.2.314
  8. 8.Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44(1), 113–126. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.44.1.113
  9. 9.Batson, C. D., Fultz, J., & Schoenrade, P. A. (1987). Distress and empathy: Two qualitatively distinct vicarious emotions with different motivational consequences. Journal of Personality, 55(1), 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1987.tb00426.x
  10. 10.Goetz, J. L., Keltner, D., & Simon-Thomas, E. (2010). Compassion: An evolutionary analysis and empirical review. Psychological Bulletin, 136(3), 351–374. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018807
  11. 11.Strauss, C., Lever Taylor, B., Gu, J., Kuyken, W., Baer, R., Jones, F., & Cavanagh, K. (2016). What is compassion and how can we measure it? A review of definitions and measures. Clinical Psychology Review, 47, 15–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2016.05.004
  12. 12.Klimecki, O. M., Leiberg, S., Ricard, M., & Singer, T. (2014). Differential pattern of functional brain plasticity after compassion and empathy training. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9(6), 873–879. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nst060
  13. 13.Neff, K. (2003). Self-compassion: An alternative conceptualization of a healthy attitude toward oneself. Self and Identity, 2(2), 85–101. https://doi.org/10.1080/15298860309032
  14. 14.Rogers, C. R. (1957). The necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality change. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 21(2), 95–103. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0045357
  15. 15.Rogers, C. R. (1959). A theory of therapy, personality, and interpersonal relationships, as developed in the client-centered framework. McGraw-Hill. openlibrary.org/works/OL43315492W
  16. 16.Zilcha-Mano, S. (2017). Is the alliance really therapeutic? Revisiting this question in light of recent methodological advances. American Psychologist, 72(4), 311–325. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0040435

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