Omission bias
- Concept · Judgment and decision-making; moral psychology
- Moderate evidence
- Published November 15, 2026
- 2 sources
- 1 min read
In short
Related in this topic
On this page
Key facts
- Field
- Judgment and decision-making; moral psychology
- Originators
- Jonathan Baron, with Ilana Ritov, Mark Spranca and Elisa Minsk
- First described
- 1990
- Topics
- Cognitive biases
State of the evidence
Moderate evidenceScenario experiments show harmful omissions judged less immoral, or as less bad decisions, than matched harmful commissions[1]. The same asymmetry appears in hypothetical vaccination choices, where the risk of acting is weighed more heavily than a larger risk of not acting[2].
Evidence labels summarise the research literature; they are not recommendations. How labels are assigned
Omission bias is the judgment that a harmful omission is less bad than a harmful commission when intentions, motives and consequences are held constant[1]. It is a bias in evaluating acts and failures to act. It differs from status quo bias, a general preference for the current state of affairs. Omissions as potentially morally injurious events are described under moral injury.
Matched omission and commission scenarios
Spranca, Minsk and Baron presented scenarios with pairs of options, one an omission and the other a commission, holding intentions, motives and consequences constant. Participants often rated harmful omissions as less immoral, or as less bad decisions, than harmful commissions. These ratings went with judgments that omissions do not cause outcomes. No reverse effect appeared for good outcomes, and a few participants were willing to accept greater harm in order to avoid acting. The authors described the bias as an overgeneralization of a useful heuristic to cases where it is not justified[1].
Features that separate omissions from commissions
Further experiments showed that the judgments depended on features that ordinarily distinguish the two. A commission ordinarily involves physical movement, and an omission ordinarily has salient alternative causes. The consequences of an omission would also occur if the actor were absent or unaware of them[1].
Reluctance to vaccinate
Ritov and Baron studied the bias in a medical choice. Participants were reluctant to vaccinate a hypothetical child when the vaccination itself could cause death, even when that outcome was much less likely than death from the disease it prevented. Reluctance increased when there was a risk group for death from the vaccine, even though no test for membership in that group was available. A risk group for death from the disease had no such effect[2].
Sources2
Numbered in order of first citation.
- 1.Spranca, M., Minsk, E., & Baron, J. (1991). Omission and commission in judgment and choice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27(1), 76–105. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(91)90011-t
- 2.Ritov, I., & Baron, J. (1990). Reluctance to vaccinate: Omission bias and ambiguity. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 3(4), 263–277. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.3960030404
Related entries 4
- Cognitive biasesTopic
- Moral injuryConcept
- Status quo biasConcept
- Outcome biasConcept
Cite this entry
APA 7
Psych Dictionary. (2026, November 15). Omission bias. In Psych Dictionary. https://www.psychdictionary.com/concepts/omission-bias
MLA 9
“Omission Bias.” Psych Dictionary, 15 Nov. 2026, www.psychdictionary.com/concepts/omission-bias.