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Psych Dictionary

Framing effect

  • Concept · Judgment and decision-making
  • Strong evidence
  • Published November 15, 2026
  • 3 sources
  • 1 min read

In short

The framing effect is a shift in preference produced by describing the same decision problem in different ways, such as in terms of gains or in terms of losses. Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated it in 1981, and meta-analyses find risky-choice framing effects reliable.

Key facts

Field
Judgment and decision-making
Originators
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
First described
1981
Also known as
Framing bias; Risky-choice framing effect

State of the evidence

Strong evidence

A p-curve reanalysis of Kühberger’s meta-analysis estimated a risky-choice framing effect of d = 0.52 after taking publication bias into account, close to the Many Labs estimate of d = 0.60 and to a new meta-analysis of 2016 experiments (d = 0.56)[1]. The explanation of the effect is debated; its existence is not[1].

Evidence labels summarise the research literature; they are not recommendations. How labels are assigned

The framing effect is a change in preference that follows from a change in how a decision problem is formulated, when the options and their outcomes stay the same[2]. In risky-choice framing, the outcomes of a risky decision are described either as gains or as losses[1]. It is not anchoring bias, in which an earlier number pulls a later estimate toward it, and it is not loss aversion, the greater weight of losses than of equal gains.

Gain and loss descriptions of the same outcomes

Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated reversals of preference in 1981 with choices about monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and with questions about the loss of human lives. They attributed the shifts to psychological principles that govern how decision problems are perceived and how probabilities and outcomes are evaluated. They compared the effects of frames on preferences to the effects of perspective on perceptual appearance. The dependence of preferences on the formulation of a problem, they argued, is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice[2].

Meta-analytic estimates for risky choice

Kühberger’s 1998 meta-analysis of framing in risky decisions[3] reported an effect of d = 0.31[1]. A 2018 reanalysis of the same data used p-curve, a method that takes publication bias into account, and estimated d = 0.52. That figure is close to the d = 0.60 found for gain-loss framing in the Many Labs Replication Project. A new meta-analysis of experiments published in 2016 found d = 0.56. Most moderators proved effective, so the size of the effect varies with how the framing task is manipulated. The reanalysis found no evidence of intense p-hacking[1].

Sources3

Numbered in order of first citation.

  1. 1.Steiger, A., & Kühberger, A. (2018). A meta-analytic re-appraisal of the framing effect. Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 226(1), 45–55. https://doi.org/10.1027/2151-2604/a000321
  2. 2.Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211(4481), 453–458. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7455683
  3. 3.Kühberger, A. (1998). The influence of framing on risky decisions: A meta-analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 75(1), 23–55. https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1998.2781

Cite this entry

  • APA 7

    Psych Dictionary. (2026, November 15). Framing effect. In Psych Dictionary. https://www.psychdictionary.com/concepts/framing-effect

  • MLA 9

    “Framing Effect.” Psych Dictionary, 15 Nov. 2026, www.psychdictionary.com/concepts/framing-effect.

Written by Editorial team. First published November 15, 2026. Editorial standards

Educational reference material. Nothing on this site is a diagnosis, a treatment recommendation or a substitute for care from a qualified clinician.