Skip to content
Psych Dictionary

Cognitive biases

  • Topic
  • Published November 15, 2026
  • 22 sources
  • 4 min read

In short

Cognitive biases are systematic, predictable departures of judgment from a normative standard such as probability theory. The research grew from Tversky and Kahneman’s heuristics-and-biases program of the 1970s; critics dispute the norms it applies, and replications have tested its classic findings.

Key facts

Period
1970s–present
Also known as
Heuristics and biases; Judgmental biases; Biases in judgment and decision-making

A cognitive bias is a systematic and predictable error in judgment: a departure from a normative rule, such as a law of probability, that recurs across people and situations instead of scattering at random. Kahneman and Tversky described the deviations of subjective from objective probability as reliable, systematic and difficult to eliminate. They proposed that people replace the laws of chance with heuristics, which sometimes yield reasonable estimates and quite often do not[1]. The bias is the error; a heuristic is the judgment strategy proposed to produce it.

Cognitive biases and cognitive distortions

Cognitive biases are not cognitive distortions. The terms come from different research traditions and are judged against different standards. Cognitive distortions are a clinical construct. Aaron Beck described systematic errors such as arbitrary inference, selective abstraction and overgeneralization in the thinking of depressed patients, and proposed that many features of depression could be characterized as a thought disorder[2]. A cognitive bias in judgment research is defined by comparison with a normative answer, such as the conjunction rule of probability theory. Violations of that rule appear in the judgments of lay people and of experts alike[3].

The heuristics-and-biases program

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman built the program in a series of papers in the 1970s. Their 1971 paper argued that people regard a randomly drawn sample as highly representative of its population. A questionnaire showed that professional psychologists held an exaggerated belief in the likelihood of replicating an obtained finding[4]. The 1972 paper introduced the representativeness heuristic, in which probability is judged by similarity to a parent population and to the process that generated the event[1].

In 1973 they described the availability heuristic, the estimation of frequency or likelihood from the ease of retrieval, construction or association[5]. A second 1973 paper argued that intuitive predictions follow representativeness and are therefore insensitive to the reliability of the evidence and to prior probabilities[6]. The 1974 article in Science summarized three heuristics, adding adjustment from an anchor, the source of anchoring bias. It described all three as highly economical and usually effective, but as leading to systematic and predictable errors. The 1983 study of the conjunction fallacy showed how representativeness and availability can make a conjunction appear more probable than one of its constituents.

Later work applied the approach beyond probability judgment. Finucane and colleagues proposed an affect heuristic, by which judgments of risk and of benefit both derive from a person’s affective reaction to a hazard[7].

Ecological rationality and other critiques

Gerd Gigerenzer argued that the program diagnosed so-called cognitive illusions against unnecessarily narrow norms of sound reasoning, and relied on vague heuristics that explain everything and nothing. He called for detailed process models that predict when judgments are valid and when they are not[8]. Kahneman and Tversky replied that the critique misrepresented their position, and that judgments of frequency, not only subjective probabilities, are susceptible to large and systematic biases[9].

Two lines of evidence fed the dispute. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage showed that Bayesian computation is simpler with frequency formats than with probability formats; given frequencies, statistically naive participants reached up to 50% of their inferences by Bayesian algorithms[10]. Hertwig and Gigerenzer found that people infer nonmathematical meanings of “probability” in the Linda problem, and that contexts favoring its mathematical meaning increase conformity to the conjunction rule[11].

The alternative proposed by Gigerenzer and his colleagues is the study of ecological rationality. It seeks the domain-specific simple heuristics that computationally bounded minds use, and explains how they produce accurate decisions by exploiting the structure of information in their environments[12]. Heuristics, in this account, are efficient processes that ignore part of the information, and how well one performs is an empirical question rather than an a priori one. Tests of formal models indicate that ignoring information can yield more accurate judgments than weighting and adding all of it when predictability is low and samples are small[13].

A further critique concerns measurement. Some reported biases may arise partly from statistical artifacts. In the Dunning–Kruger effect, the asymmetric errors of low and high scorers were predicted by regression to the mean combined with the better-than-average effect[14]. In studies of unrealistic optimism, sampling constraints, response scales and the rarity of negative events can produce an apparent optimism bias from unbiased responses[15].

Replication of classic bias findings

Multi-site projects have measured how often classic and contemporary psychology findings replicate. In the first Many Labs project, ten of 13 classic and contemporary effects replicated consistently across 36 samples, while flag priming and currency priming did not replicate[16]. Many Labs 2 found significant effects in the original direction for 15 of 28 findings, with a median effect size of d = 0.15 against 0.60 in the original studies[17]. The wider debate over reproducibility is described under replication crisis.

Preregistered replications of single bias experiments have reproduced the direction of several original effects, with magnitudes that differ from the originals. Eight of nine problems from the 1972 representativeness paper replicated in a sample of 623[18]. Outcome bias replicated in a between-participants design, including among participants who said that outcomes should not be considered[19]. The risk–benefit effect attributed to the affect heuristic replicated in two well-powered studies[20]. A close replication of the Linda problem supported the conjunction effect, while a second profile, James, showed none[21]. The illusion-of-control effect reported by Langer and Roth replicated online, with smaller effect sizes than the original[22].

Entries in this topic 45

Concepts45

Sources22

Numbered in order of first citation.

  1. 1.Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3(3), 430–454. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3
  2. 2.Beck, A. T. (1964). Thinking and depression: II. Theory and therapy. Archives of General Psychiatry, 10(6), 561–571. https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.1964.01720240015003
  3. 3.Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90(4), 293–315. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293
  4. 4.Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971). Belief in the law of small numbers. Psychological Bulletin, 76(2), 105–110. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0031322
  5. 5.Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5(2), 207–232. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9
  6. 6.Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80(4), 237–251. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0034747
  7. 7.Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., & Johnson, S. M. (2000). The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1<1::aid-bdm333>3.0.co;2-s
  8. 8.Gigerenzer, G. (1996). On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky. Psychological Review, 103(3), 592–596. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.103.3.592
  9. 9.Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological Review, 103(3), 582–591. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.103.3.582
  10. 10.Gigerenzer, G., & Hoffrage, U. (1995). How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats. Psychological Review, 102(4), 684–704. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.102.4.684
  11. 11.Hertwig, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (1999). The ‘conjunction fallacy’ revisited: How intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12(4), 275–305. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(199912)12:4<275::aid-bdm323>3.0.co;2-m
  12. 12.Todd, P. M., & Gigerenzer, G. (2007). Environments that make us smart. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16(3), 167–171. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00497.x
  13. 13.Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011). Heuristic decision making. Annual Review of Psychology, 62(1), 451–482. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
  14. 14.Krueger, J., & Mueller, R. A. (2002). Unskilled, unaware, or both? The better-than-average heuristic and statistical regression predict errors in estimates of own performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(2), 180–188. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.2.180
  15. 15.Harris, A. J., & Hahn, U. (2011). Unrealistic optimism about future life events: A cautionary note. Psychological Review, 118(1), 135–154. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020997
  16. 16.Klein, R. A., Ratliff, K. A., Vianello, M., Adams, R. B., Bahník, Š., Bernstein, M. J., Bocian, K., Brandt, M. J., Brooks, B., Brumbaugh, C. C., Cemalcilar, Z., Chandler, J., Cheong, W., Davis, W. E., Devos, T., Eisner, M., Frankowska, N., Furrow, D., Galliani, E. M., … Nosek, B. A. (2014). Investigating variation in replicability: A “Many Labs” replication project. Social Psychology, 45(3), 142–152. https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000178
  17. 17.Klein, R. A., Vianello, M., Hasselman, F., Adams, B. G., Adams, R. B., Alper, S., Aveyard, M., Axt, J. R., Babalola, M. T., Bahník, Š., Batra, R., Berkics, M., Bernstein, M. J., Berry, D. R., Bialobrzeska, O., Binan, E. D., Bocian, K., Brandt, M. J., Busching, R., … Nosek, B. A. (2018). Many Labs 2: Investigating variation in replicability across samples and settings. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 1(4), 443–490. https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918810225
  18. 18.Mayiwar, L., Wan, K. H., Løhre, E., & Feldman, G. (2025). Revisiting representativeness heuristic classic paradigms: Replication and extensions of nine experiments in Kahneman and Tversky (1972). Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 78(4), 707–730. https://doi.org/10.1177/17470218241255916
  19. 19.Aiyer, S., Kam, H. C., Ng, K. Y., Young, N. A., Shi, J., & Feldman, G. (2023). Outcomes affect evaluations of decision quality: Replication and extensions of Baron and Hershey’s (1988) outcome bias Experiment 1. International Review of Social Psychology, 36(1), 12. https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.751
  20. 20.Efendić, E., Chandrashekar, S. P., Lee, C. S., Yeung, L. Y., Kim, M. J., Lee, C. Y., & Feldman, G. (2022). Risky therefore not beneficial: Replication and extension of Finucane et al.’s (2000) affect heuristic experiment. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 13(7), 1173–1184. https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506211056761
  21. 21.Chandrashekar, S., Cheng, Y. H., Fong, C. L., Leung, Y. C., Wong, Y. T., Cheng, B. L., & Feldman, G. (2021). Frequency estimation and semantic ambiguity do not eliminate conjunction bias, when it occurs: Replication and extension of Mellers, Hertwig, and Kahneman (2001). Meta-Psychology, 5. https://doi.org/10.15626/mp.2020.2474
  22. 22.Eben, C., Chen, Z., Billieux, J., & Verbruggen, F. (2023). Outcome sequences and illusion of control - Part I: An online replication of Langer & Roth (1975). International Gambling Studies, 23(2), 257–268. https://doi.org/10.1080/14459795.2022.2133906

Further reading

Cite this entry

  • APA 7

    Psych Dictionary. (2026, November 15). Cognitive biases. In Psych Dictionary. https://www.psychdictionary.com/topics/cognitive-biases

  • MLA 9

    “Cognitive Biases.” Psych Dictionary, 15 Nov. 2026, www.psychdictionary.com/topics/cognitive-biases.

Written by Editorial team. First published November 15, 2026. Editorial standards

Educational reference material. Nothing on this site is a diagnosis, a treatment recommendation or a substitute for care from a qualified clinician.