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Psych Dictionary

Psychological flexibility

  • Concept · Clinical psychology (contextual behavioral science)
  • Mixed or contested
  • Published October 19, 2026
  • 16 sources
  • 4 min read

In short

Psychological flexibility is the central construct of acceptance and commitment therapy, the capacity to stay in contact with unwanted thoughts and feelings while persisting in or changing behavior according to chosen values. Its opposite, psychological inflexibility, includes experiential avoidance.

Key facts

Field
Clinical psychology (contextual behavioral science)
Originators
Steven C. Hayes and colleagues, within acceptance and commitment therapy; experiential avoidance was set out by Hayes, Wilson and colleagues in 1996
First described
1990s–2000s, United States
Also known as
Psychological inflexibility (its opposite)

State of the evidence

Mixed or contested

Questionnaire measures of psychological inflexibility predict a range of outcomes from mental health to work absence[1], and mediation studies of ACT have generally found change in the proposed processes consistent with the model[2]. Those mediation studies were of limited methodological quality[2], and the most widely used measure, the AAQ-II, behaved in several analyses more like a measure of distress or neuroticism than of acceptance[3][4]. Because much of the evidence rests on that one measure[5], whether flexibility is a distinct cause of psychological health, rather than a correlate of low distress, is contested.

Evidence labels summarise the research literature; they are not recommendations. How labels are assigned

Psychological flexibility is the target of acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT): the capacity to stay in contact with the present moment, including thoughts and feelings a person would rather not have, and to persist in or change behavior according to chosen values[6][7]. A review in social and personality psychology gives a shorter definition: the tendency to respond to situations in ways that facilitate valued goal pursuit, particularly when that pursuit produces distress[5].

The construct has a narrow and a broad sense. In ACT it is a technical term defined by the therapy’s model, and it is treated there as the pinnacle of emotional health[5]. In a broader sense, Kashdan and Rottenberg used the term for a wide range of abilities: recognizing and adapting to the demands of a situation, shifting mindset or behavior when a strategy stops working, keeping a balance among important areas of life, and staying aware, open and committed to behavior consistent with values[8]. Their review drew on emotion regulation, mindfulness and acceptance research, social and personality psychology and neuropsychology, argued that the importance of flexibility had been obscured by the isolation of these research areas from one another, and favored dynamic, real-world approaches to measuring it[8]. This entry concerns mainly the ACT construct and its measures, and marks where the evidence comes from ACT’s own research program.

Flexibility and inflexibility in the ACT model

ACT describes flexibility through six interrelated processes, acceptance, defusion, contact with the present moment, self, values and committed action, set out in the ACT entry[6] . Hayes and colleagues describe the contextual therapies, ACT among them, as aiming at a more open, aware and active approach to living[9].

The ACT account of psychopathology is built around the opposite, psychological inflexibility, which the model traces largely to two processes[6]. Cognitive fusion is the domination of behavior by verbal and cognitive processes, such as the literal content of a thought, to the exclusion of other influences; cognitive defusion is the technique aimed at it. Experiential avoidance, which fusion partly produces, is the attempt to alter the form, frequency or intensity of unwanted private experiences even when doing so is costly[6]. Inflexibility is therefore not simply the absence of flexibility. It names specific processes that the therapy treats as targets.

Experiential avoidance

Hayes, Wilson and colleagues introduced experiential avoidance in 1996 as a functional diagnostic dimension, arguing that many forms of psychopathology can be understood as unhealthy efforts to escape and avoid emotions, thoughts, memories and other private experiences[10]. Later researchers treat the same construct, scored in the opposite direction, as acceptance or psychological flexibility, and a single questionnaire has been presented as measuring all three[4][1]. Its definitions, measures and associations with psychopathology are described under experiential avoidance.

Measurement with the AAQ and its critics

Much of the research on the construct has used the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire[5]. Its second version, the AAQ-II, was presented as a measure of what is variously called acceptance, experiential avoidance and psychological inflexibility. Across 2,816 participants in six samples it showed a mean internal consistency of .84 and test–retest reliability of .81 at three months and .79 at twelve, predicted outcomes from mental health to work absence, and correlated .97 with the first version[1].

Later studies questioned what it measures. In an exploratory factor analysis, AAQ-II items related more strongly to items written to measure distress than to items measuring acceptance[3]. In an online sample of 1,052 adults and a college sample of 364, the AAQ-II loaded with indicators of neuroticism and negative affect rather than with other third-wave constructs. The authors concluded that it functions as a measure of neuroticism or negative affect, and recommended the Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (MEAQ), which showed better convergent and discriminant validity, for assessing experiential avoidance[4]. A later review noted that much of what is known about psychological flexibility hinges on this single measurement approach, that the AAQ-II is highly correlated with distress itself, and that existing measures ignore the context in which flexibility matters most, the pursuit of valued goals[5].

Alternatives have been developed. The MEAQ, a 62-item measure with six subscales, was built to be distinguishable from neuroticism and remained associated with psychopathology and quality of life after neuroticism was controlled[11]. The Multidimensional Psychological Flexibility Inventory, a 60-item scale developed in 3,040 online respondents, assesses twelve dimensions of the hexaflex model[12].

Evidence on flexibility as a mediator

The ACT model predicts that treatment works by increasing flexibility. Two of the main syntheses of the evidence come from the developers’ own group. Their 2006 review judged the correlational, component and process evidence broadly supportive but the literature not mature[13]. A meta-analysis of 66 laboratory component studies, co-authored by Hayes, found positive effects for components based on acceptance, defusion, present-moment awareness and values compared with inactive conditions, and larger effects on the outcomes the model specifies[14].

In a treatment trial, changes in experiential avoidance, acting with awareness and acceptance mediated outcomes for ACT relative to cognitive therapy, while changes in observing and describing experience did so for cognitive therapy[15]. In a trial for anxiety disorders, ACT produced higher AAQ scores than CBT at 12 months among completers[16]. A systematic review of 12 mediation studies published between 2006 and 2015 found results generally consistent with the model, but the studies were of limited methodological quality and concentrated on a few of the six processes[2].

The measurement problem limits these findings. Wolgast pointed out that the AAQ is central to the empirical validation of the ACT model[3]. If the AAQ-II largely indexes distress, a change in AAQ scores that accompanies a fall in symptoms may record the same improvement twice rather than identify the process that produced it. Measures designed to separate flexibility from distress[11][12] allow the mediation claim to be tested more directly than the AAQ-II does.

Sources16

Numbered in order of first citation.

  1. 1.Bond, F. W., Hayes, S. C., Baer, R. A., Carpenter, K. M., Guenole, N., Orcutt, H. K., Waltz, T., & Zettle, R. D. (2011). Preliminary psychometric properties of the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire–II: A revised measure of psychological inflexibility and experiential avoidance. Behavior Therapy, 42(4), 676–688. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2011.03.007
  2. 2.Stockton, D., Kellett, S., Berrios, R., Sirois, F., Wilkinson, N., & Miles, G. (2019). Identifying the underlying mechanisms of change during acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT): A systematic review of contemporary mediation studies. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 47(3), 332–362. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352465818000553
  3. 3.Wolgast, M. (2014). What does the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II) really measure?. Behavior Therapy, 45(6), 831–839. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2014.07.002
  4. 4.Rochefort, C., Baldwin, A. S., & Chmielewski, M. (2018). Experiential avoidance: An examination of the construct validity of the AAQ-II and MEAQ. Behavior Therapy, 49(3), 435–449. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2017.08.008
  5. 5.Doorley, J. D., Goodman, F. R., Kelso, K. C., & Kashdan, T. B. (2020). Psychological flexibility: What we know, what we do not know, and what we think we know. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 14(12), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12566
  6. 6.Hayes, S. C., Levin, M. E., Plumb-Vilardaga, J., Villatte, J. L., & Pistorello, J. (2013). Acceptance and commitment therapy and contextual behavioral science: Examining the progress of a distinctive model of behavioral and cognitive therapy. Behavior Therapy, 44(2), 180–198. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2009.08.002
  7. 7.Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D., & Wilson, K. G. (2012). Acceptance and commitment therapy: The process and practice of mindful change (2nd ed.). Guilford Press.
  8. 8.Kashdan, T. B., & Rottenberg, J. (2010). Psychological flexibility as a fundamental aspect of health. Clinical Psychology Review, 30(7), 865–878. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2010.03.001
  9. 9.Hayes, S. C., Villatte, M., Levin, M., & Hildebrandt, M. (2011). Open, aware, and active: Contextual approaches as an emerging trend in the behavioral and cognitive therapies. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 7(1), 141–168. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-032210-104449
  10. 10.Hayes, S. C., Wilson, K. G., Gifford, E. V., Follette, V. M., & Strosahl, K. (1996). Experiential avoidance and behavioral disorders: A functional dimensional approach to diagnosis and treatment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64(6), 1152–1168. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-006X.64.6.1152
  11. 11.Gámez, W., Chmielewski, M., Kotov, R., Ruggero, C., & Watson, D. (2011). Development of a measure of experiential avoidance: The Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire. Psychological Assessment, 23(3), 692–713. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023242
  12. 12.Rolffs, J. L., Rogge, R. D., & Wilson, K. G. (2018). Disentangling components of flexibility via the hexaflex model: Development and validation of the Multidimensional Psychological Flexibility Inventory (MPFI). Assessment, 25(4), 458–482. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191116645905
  13. 13.Hayes, S. C., Luoma, J. B., Bond, F. W., Masuda, A., & Lillis, J. (2006). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: Model, processes and outcomes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2005.06.006
  14. 14.Levin, M. E., Hildebrandt, M. J., Lillis, J., & Hayes, S. C. (2012). The impact of treatment components suggested by the psychological flexibility model: A meta-analysis of laboratory-based component studies. Behavior Therapy, 43(4), 741–756. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2012.05.003
  15. 15.Forman, E. M., Herbert, J. D., Moitra, E., Yeomans, P. D., & Geller, P. A. (2007). A randomized controlled effectiveness trial of acceptance and commitment therapy and cognitive therapy for anxiety and depression. Behavior Modification, 31(6), 772–799. https://doi.org/10.1177/0145445507302202
  16. 16.Arch, J. J., Eifert, G. H., Davies, C., Plumb Vilardaga, J. C., Rose, R. D., & Craske, M. G. (2012). Randomized clinical trial of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) versus acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) for mixed anxiety disorders. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 80(5), 750–765. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028310

Further reading

  • Hayes, S. C., Luoma, J. B., Bond, F. W., Masuda, A., & Lillis, J. (2006). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: Model, processes and outcomes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2005.06.006
  • Doorley, J. D., Goodman, F. R., Kelso, K. C., & Kashdan, T. B. (2020). Psychological flexibility: What we know, what we do not know, and what we think we know. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 14(12), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12566
  • Kashdan, T. B., & Rottenberg, J. (2010). Psychological flexibility as a fundamental aspect of health. Clinical Psychology Review, 30(7), 865–878. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2010.03.001

Cite this entry

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    Psych Dictionary. (2026, October 19). Psychological flexibility. In Psych Dictionary. https://www.psychdictionary.com/concepts/psychological-flexibility

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Written by Editorial team. First published October 19, 2026. Editorial standards

Educational reference material. Nothing on this site is a diagnosis, a treatment recommendation or a substitute for care from a qualified clinician.